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The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the necessity to establish a
new world order has presented a challenge to the United States (U.S.) to reformulate its
foreign policy. Future U.S. policy in the Asia Pacific Region will inevitably affect the
U.S. relationship with the Republic of the Philippines (R.P), and this thesis provides a
framework for understanding that relationship better. This thesis traces the roots of social
unrest in the Philippines and demonstrates how the conflict between the elite and the
common people has been the cause of rebellion, revolt, revolution and insurgency from the
beginning of the Spanish colonial era until today. It concludes that the "special" relations
which have characterized traditional U.S. policy in the Philippines are no longer in the best
interests of either the U.S. or the R.P.. It recommends that the U.S. withdraw its military
forces from the Philippines before the end of the century and substitute directed economic
assistance for military assistance as the best method of promoting democracy and
contributing to the removal of causes of insurgency in the Philippines.
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I. INTRODUCTION
After nearly one hundred years of colonial and "special" relations, the United States
(U.S.) and the Republic of the Philippines (R.P.) have reached a critical point in their
bilateral relationship. The evolving world order, changing interests of the United States,
delicate sovereignty issues, and the reemergence of nationalistic feelings among Filipinos
have brought the U.S. and R.P. to this point of decision. Together, the two governments
will either positively redefine their relationship and build upon the many strengths in their
long association, or attempt to retain this "special" relationship and allow their mutually
beneficial national friendship to deteriorate.
Historically, the Americans have pursued their interests in the Philippines by working
through the Philippine elite--a practice which pre-dated the arrival of the Americans and
was initiated by the Spanish colonial administration. This practice is the reason there is a
rift between the elite and the masses today. Over the years, U.S. policies in the Philippines
have exacerbated this rift because they have tended to favor the elites and work to the
detriment of the masses. The U.S. has had little choice but to work through the elites
because the elite-led government ultimately controlled the access to bases which were vital
to the national security of the U.S. However, the international relations environment is
changing and along with it, U.S. interests in the Philippines.
U.S. interests around the world and in the Philippines began to change in 1989 when
the retreat of communism in Eastern Europe eased tensions between the U.S. and
U.S.S.R.. The end of the Cold War in Europe demonstrated how the U.S. strategy of
"containment" had been very effective there; however, the strategy still faced a continuing
challenge in the Asia Pacific Region from the People's Republic of China, the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Fortunately, Cold War
tensions in the APR which were linked to U.S.-U.S.S.R. competition did ameliorate, and
as they did, the relative importance of U.S. access to Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base
in the Philippines began to fade along with the Soviet threat.
The U.S.-U.S.S.R. rapprochement which accompanied the end of the Cold War in
Europe is the foundation upon which the international community can build a new world
order and the U.S. can refocus its interests. As the bipolar world disappears, the U.S. will
be able to retreat from the vigilance of "containment" and build a new strategy with a
different mix of political, military and economic interests. U.S. military forces in the
Philippines will inevitably be affected by these coming changes.
The United States must formulate a new policy to reflect its evolving interests in the
Philippines. This policy should be based on a thorough understanding of the roots of
social unrest, the long-standing conflict between the social classes, and the relationship
between the elite and their former colonial patrons. The objective of this thesis is to trace
the roots of social unrest in the Philippines and demonstrate how conflict between the elite
and the common people has been the cause of rebellion, revolt, revolution and insurgency
from the beginning of the Spanish colonial era until today.
This thesis will tell the story of social unrest from the 16th century through the Aquino
administration. The historical eras for review include the Spanish Colonial Period, the
American Colonial Period, Early Philippine Independence, the Period of Budding
Nationalism, the Marcos Years and Current Politics. Note that throughout this thesis, the
story of unrest will be largely framed by the conflict between the elite and the masses.
With this foundation complete, this thesis will draw conclusions, analyze U.S. interests in
the Philippines, pose three policy options, then recommend one option for the U.S. to
implement.
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II. THE SPANISH COLONIAL PERIOD (1565-1898)
In 1521, Ferdinand Magellan landed on the island of Cebu in the archipelago which
would later be named the Philippines. Spain would colonize the Philippines in 15651 and
set out to exploit the people and resources for the benefit of the Spanish crown.2 The
Spanish colonial administration would impose the severest controls on the native
population, lay the groundwork for centuries of social unrest, spark nationalistic feelings
among the Filipinos and lose the colony in a war with the Americans. The primary legacy
of Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines would be one of class conflict.
A. SPANISH CONTROL
During its 350 years of rule, the Spanish Crown was efficient in its administration of
the Philippines, controlling the archipelago until the revolt of 1896 with never more than
5,000 Spaniards.3 The colonial administration would enforce its rule and fulfill its agenda
by exercising four levels of executive authority in the Philippines: the da=u controlled a
barangay (village), a gobernador-cillo controlled a pueblo, an alcalde major controlled a
province and the governor-general ruled the colony.4 This system of executive authority
continued until the Spanish exodus in 1898.
1. Teodoro A. Agoncillo, Introduction to Filipino History (Manila: Bookmark,
1974) p. 39.
2. Nina Vreeland, Area Handbook for the Philippines (Washington DC: US
Government Printing Office/American University, 1976) p. 46.
3. Teodoro A. Agoncillo, A Short History Of The Philippines (New York: The New
American Library, 1975) p. 45.
4. Pedro A. Gagelonia, Filipino Nation: History and Government (Manila: Navotas
Press, 1977) p. 34, 78.
3
A datu was the native chief of his village and local custom prescribed that he inherit his
position. The Spanish perceptively continued the traditions of the datu and used the
position as an integral component in the colonial administration. However, the Spanish
placed a limit on Filipino participation in government. Filipinos were not permitted to
advance beyond gobemador-cillo, and even that appointment was controlled by the colonial
administration and the Church.5
The key to efficient colonial rule in the Philippines lay in Spain's practice of co-opting
the barangay's datu and monitoring local activities by placing Spanish clerics in each
barangay. The depth of control is better understood when one learns that church and state
were unified under the Spanish Crown and the union was so secure that government
officials were "defenders of the faith" and priests were government agents. This practice
permitted extraordinary control of the Filipinos because the marriage between church and
state implied that obedience to the Church and allegiance to the state were both necessary
for one to receive eternal salvation. The conversion of Filipinos to Catholicism may have
been a separate and important achievement to the Spanish, but the near wholesale
conversion of Filipinos permitted an impressive blend of Spanish civil and "spiritual"
control, even down to the village level. 6
What kind of people were the Spanish trying to control? When the Spanish arrived
they found a native population of Negrito, Indonesian and Malay peoples; however,
Chinese, Vietnamese, Japanese and Arab immigrants mixed with the blood of the native
population. 7 Interestingly, these diverse peoples were exposed to a common culture, yet
5. Vreeland, Handbook, p. 48-49.
6. Agoncillo, Introduction, p. 49-50.
7. Gagelonia, Filipino, p. 19.
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they were divided by eight major languages and countless dialects.8 Language diversity is
one reason a central system of government never evolved to unite the barangays. Alliances
between barangays did form, but they were temporary and typically designed to defend
against attack from local enemies.9 Excluding the centralized governments of the Moslem-
dominated islands further south, the barangay was the most sophisticated form of
government in the Philippines prior to the Spanish arrival. 10
The diverse languages and the absence of a central government in the archipelago
divided the native people. The Spanish effectively exploited these disadvantages for their
gain. Had Spain chosen, language could have been a common bond unifying its colonial
subjects; however, only a handful of Filipino elites were permitted to learn Spanish. 11 The
result would be two classes of native people: a very select group of Filipinos closely
associated with Spanish government and business (illustrados), and a remaining population
of unorganized peasants with little except the potential power of numbers. The Filipino
elite consequently grew closer to the Spanish colonial administration but further away from
the Filipino peasants.
Spain's language policy enabled the colonial administration to control its subjects more
effectively. The colonial administrators would pit Filipino elites against Filipino peasants,
employ conscripts from one linguistic group against another, and similarly manipulate
competing barangays. The Spanish effectively implemented their "divide and rule" policy
8. Agoncillo, A Short History, p. 24.
9. Agoncillo, Introduction, p. 19.
10. Agoncillo, Introduction, p. 9.
11. Karnow, Stanley, In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines (New
York: Random House, 1989) p. 201.
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in the Philippines, 12 but the policy led the Filipino people to detect their common identity
and work to overcome the divisiveness.
B. THE NATURE OF SOCIAL UNREST
Localized peasant rebellion, elite attempts at reform, and open revolt each played a part
in Filipino efforts to improve their lives under Spanish control. Peasant rebellion in the
Philippines grew out of four unfair practices the government permitted to continue: forced
conscription, forced labor, the concentration of wealth among the elite, and the
concentration of power among priests and their authority over agriculture interests. 13 To
exacerbate the problem, financial gain was the principal reason Spain maintained the
Philippines as a colony; 14 and as an unfortunate consequence, greed and corruption
infected every level of the colonial administration. Local government officials, priests and
landowners garnered much of their wealth by working in unison to exploit the peasants;
and consequently, the peasants directed their grievances against these local elites.
Spanish exploitation of the native people was universal in the archipelago and created
an environment ripe for peasant unrest Initial protests such as the Pampanga Revolt of
1585 and the Tondo Conspiracy of 1587 erupted as peasants chafed under the final stdges
of Spanish conquest. 15 Later, unrest seemed tailored to respond to specific losses suffered
by the peasants. The clergy for example, were unrelenting and unforgiving in their
program for converting Filipinos to Catholicism. The Filipinos responded to the
12. Agoncillo, Introduction, p. 79, 85, 92.
13. Agoncillo, Introduction, p. 45, 60, 71-79.
14. Gagelonia, Filipino, p. 74.
15. John Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines (Madison, Wisconsin:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1959) p. 145.
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denigration of their nativistic faith with the Bohol Rebellion in 1622 and the Panay
Rebellion in 1663; both were failed attempts by the native people to revive their own fait'.
and throw off the Spanish Catholic yoke. 16
In the eighteenth century, agrarian rebellions like those in Batangas, Laguna, and
Morong arose in response to abuses suffered by peasants on friar-owned estates.
Increasingly, the Spanish relied upon the friars to control the people and through the
eighteenth and nineteenth century, the Filipinos focused their wrath on the friars and other
elites. 17 Just as the Spanish exploitation of the peasants had been universal throughout the
archipelago, peasant response to the abuse was also universal. Unfortunately for the
peasants, they were not effectively unified in rebellion until 1896. The Spanish colonial
administration, by contrast, was always unified in its policy of control. Peasant unrest
through the late nineteenth century can be simply characterized as local uprisings designed
to settle local peasant grievances. 18
The peasants rebelled against local elites to improve their living conditions, but it
should be noted that the unrest was neither national in scope 19 nor aimed at independence
from Spain. The peasants did not want the Spanish government to leave the Philippines,
they just wanted better treatment. With this clearly being the Filipino peasants' attitude, it
16. David R. Sturtevant, "Philippine Social Structure and its Relation to Agrarian
Unrest," A Dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Department of History,
Stanford University, California, 1958. pp. 106-108.
17. Gagelonia, Filipino, pp. 96, 110-111.
18. Phelan, Hispanization, p. 151.
19. Agoncillo, Introduction, p. 73.
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is clear that before the nineteenth century the peasants had not yet developed a national
con science .20
Filipino peasants may not have had a national conscience, but neither did the Filipino
elite. The peasants suffered from the inequities perpetuated by the Spanish and Filipino
elite, but the Filipino elite suffered their own indignity--a second class status relative to
Spanish citizens.2 1 However, to alleviate this indignity the Filipino elite did not seek
independence, but instead subjected themselves to further Spanish ridicule. The elite
sought the full inclusion of the Philippines as a province of Spain.
C. THE RISE OF FILIPINO NATIONALISM
In the 1870s, Filipino intellectuals living in Spain spearheaded a reform movement
which advocated full inclusion of the Philippines by Spain. The movement championed
five reforms: the assimilation of the Philippines as a province; full representation for the
Philippine province in the Spanish national assembly; equality of Filipinos and Spanish
before the law; equality of Filipinos and Spanish in the Church; and individual freedoms
for Filipinos. 22 The idea of reform was fostered by some of the brightest Filipino minds,
but the movement was poorly organized and financed, and its leadership was divided.
Supporters remained hopeful, but reforms and the rights of colonial subjects were of little
concern to the Spanish. 23
In 1892, the intellectual soul of the reform movement, Jose Rizal y Mercado, was
exiled to a distant Philippine island for his part in supporting reforms. Sadly for the
20. Phelan, Hispanization, p. 151.
21. Karnow, Image, p. 68.
22. Gagelonia, Filipino Nation, p. 114.
23. Agoncillo, Introduction, p. 108.
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Filipinos, any hope for reform was banished along with Rizal. In 1896, Rizal was released
from exile when he volunteered to serve the Spanish as a military surgeon in the Cuban
Revolution. However, before Rizal could reach his destination he was falsely accused of
masterminding a growing seditious movement and forced to return to the Philippines where
he was executed. In truth, Rizal had refused when rebels asked him to support their
nationalistic movement.24 Rizal may have functioned as the conscience for Spain in its
administration of the Philippines, but he remained a patriot to Spain even as he faced his
execution, stating, "I have sought political liberty, but never the freedom to rebel." The
sad irony of Rizal's martyrdom indicates how strongly many among the Filipino elite
identified with Spain.
With the failure of the elite in their attempts at reform, peasant leaders retook the
initiative and turned to revolution. Out of frustration over Rizal's exile, a secret society, the
Katipunan, was organized in 1892 to promote revolution and support Filipino peasants in
their difficult daily lives. Initially, membership in the Katipunan grew slowly, reaching
only 300 by 1895. Within a year, the membership had reached 10,000 as the awareness of
independence grew. 25
While the Katipunan membership was growing, the peasants in central and southern
Luzon began to rise up against their land owners. Food shortages and low crop prices
drove them to these desperate acts. The peasants' hopeless situation and the uncommon
injustice of Rizal's martyrdom primed them for revolt, but the Filipino elites maintained
their allegiance to Spain, fearing most of all their loss of position and wealth. To co-opt the
Filipino elite and drive a wedge between them and their Spanish masters, the founder of the
24. Karnow, Imag, p. 71.
25. Richard J. Kessler, Rebellion and Repression In The Philippines (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1988) pp. 10-11.
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Katipunan, Andres Bonifacio, forged elite signatures on the Katipunan membership rolls
and secretly passed the document to the colonial police. When the police reacted to
Bonifacio's ruse by arresting and executing Filipino elites, the newly persecuted elite had
no choice but to support the coming revolt.26
Open revolt erupted in Manila in August 1896, but the harsh conditions which fueled
revolt there were present all over the Philippines. In Manila, the Filipino peasants rallied to
Bonifacio who redirected peasant rebellious energies away from the local elite and toward
Spanish colonial rule. The rebels won early military victories under the command of
Bonifacio's brilliant subordinate, Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy. Aguinaldo's success created a
power struggle between him and Bonifacio. When Filipino officers voted to abolish the
Katipunan and establish Aguinaldo as the president of a new republic, Bonifacio
established a rival regime. In a series of events not completely understood even today,
Aguinaldo's men killed Bonifacio, thereby weakening cohesive peasant support for the
revolution. 27
The Spanish were able to regain the military initiative and trap the revolutionaries in the
mountains where Aguinaldo would offer to recognize Spanish rule under certain
conditions. The Spanish refused all meaningful conditions and drove Aguinaldo and his
key lieutenants into exile in Hong Kong in December 1897. Aguinaldo did receive a small
financial payment and the promise of further payment to some non-combatant Filipinos.
The Spanish had been very effective in throttling the military revolt, but the injustice
perpetuated on the peasants by the Spanish and the elite remained. 28
26. Karnow, Image, p. 74.
27. Karnow, Image, p. 74-77.
28. Gagelonia, Filipino, pp. 143-144.
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D. THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR
Spain was also fighting a difficult revolution in another one of their colonies, Cuba.
The U.S. was intensely interested in that skirmish because it held agribusiness interests on
the island. When the battleship, Maine, was blown up in Havana harbor, the U.S. charged
Spain with the deed and declared war on 25 April 1898. On 1 May 1898, the Spanish fleet
in East Asia was destroyed in Manila Bay by a U.S. fleet on a mission engineered by
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt. 29
The Filipinos viewed the American attack on the Spanish fleet as an opportunity to ally
with the Americans and win independence from Spain. Years later, Aguinaldo would claim
that the U.S. fleet commander, Admiral George Dewey, promised to support the Filipinos
in their bid for independence. When questioned on the subject by President McKinley,
Dewey denied he had promised any assistance to Aguinaldo or his insurgents. 3 0
Aguinaldo may have listened to Dewey with a selective ear. In any case, both Aguinaldo
and the Americans were in position to benefit from the assistance of the other, but both
would have liked assistance on their own terms.
The Americans may have taken Manila Bay from the Spanish, but the city remained
under Spanish control. Aguinaldo returned from Hong Kong with American assistance
and raised an army comprised of peasants, illustrados, and Filipino soldiers who had
defected from the Spanish army. Aguinaldo's forces engaged and easily defeated its
Spanish opposition and soon controlled all of Luzon except Manila--under Spanish control,
and the Port of Cavite--under U.S. Navy control.31
29. Agoncillo, A Short History, p. 106, 107.
30. Murat Halstead, The Life and Achievements of Admiral Dewey (Chicago: Our
Possessions Publishing Company, 1899) pp. 379-392. Karnow, M=,, pp. 110-114.
31. Vreeland, Handbook, p. 57. Agoncillo, Introduction, p. 141-143.
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On 12 June 1898, with his forces in a precarious position, Aguinaldo declared
independence from Spain to improve his political bargaining position before the American
forces landed. When the American ground forces finally arrived, the Spanish had the
opportunity they had been waiting for. The Spanish had feared surrendering to "savage"
Filipinos, so they agreed with the Americans to feign a battle then immediately surrender to
them. Aguinaldo and his Filipino forces felt betrayed when the Americans forbade them
from either participating in the battle, accepting the surrender or even entering the city.32
The American-Filipino relationship had been ill-defined before the Spanish surrender,
but after the surrender, President McKinley stated, "The insurgents and all others must
recognize the military occupation and authority of the United States."'33 Aguinaldo had
declared his country independent, but the Philippines was not even permitted to participate
in the Treaty of Paris: a treaty signed on 10 December 1898 which resolved the Spanish-
American War and ceded the Philippines to the U.S.. 34 Aguinaldo and his army found
themselves free of Spanish control, but under another colonial ruler--the U.S.. This
surrender had little effect on peasant welfare.
In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the struggle of the Filipino peasants
against the elite was temporarily overcome by the rise of nationalism. In fact, the Filipino
peasants and elites finally joined together in a common struggle for independence.
Nevertheless, the social conditions that separated the two classes remained intact. Would
the relationship between the elite and the peasants change under American colonial rule?
32. Karnow, Imge, pp. 116, 122-124.
33. Karnow, Image, p. 124.
34. Gagelonia, Filipino, pp. 165-166.
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III. THE AMERICAN COLONIAL PERIOD (1898-1946)
So far as the United States government was concerned, it had assumed one
responsibility for governing its new colony. Its challenge was to define an administration
policy and select the best means for implementing that policy. Its goal was clear: to protect
the American interest by increasing the benefits to the Filipino people. The U.S. colonial
administration was forced to make changes: how much to tackle the problems of poverty
and protest by seeking the cooperation of the revolutionist, and how far to follow the model
of the Spanish before them by working through the intellectual elite. As will be seen, the
Americans repeated the miscalculations of the former administration and worked almost
exclusively through the elite. As a result, the social unrest became even more deeply
enrooted under the American colonial administration than it had been under the Spanish
Crown.
American intentions for their colonial administration of the Philippines were
fundamentally good, but the American legacy would be both good and bad. The
Americans would defeat the Filipinos in a a brutal war, then impose a relatively benevolent
civilian colonial government which would for a time pacify the bruised Filipinos.
However, the subjugation of the peasants at the hands of the elite would continue and
peasant unrest would reemerge as the Sakdal, Hukbalahap and Philippine Communist Party
movements.
A. AMERICAN INTENTIONS
President McKinley outlined his policy for the Philippines after he signed the
December 1898 Treaty of Paris which ended the war with Spain. McKinley wanted to
"win the confidence, respect and affection" of the Filipinos and he planned to accomplish
13
this through "benevolent assimilation," the catch phrase describing the American
administrative policy.35 In desperation, Aguinaldo sent representatives to the peax-e
conference, but they and their petition for independence were ignored. 36 The Philippines
were firmly under American control and for Filipino nationalists, independence remained
decades away.
Many American interest groups wanted to retain the Philippine colony for their own
reasons: Politicians wanted the colony because it would exhibit American strength in a
world where colonies helped define power; military officers coveted the colony for its
usefulness as a springboard for protecting American commerce in Asia; protestant
missionaries wanted to counter the advances of Catholicism and evangelize the Philippines
through protestant teaching. 37
Though many American interests had plans for the new colony, the two political
parties in the U.S. agreed that independence would be the ultimate goal for the Philippines.
The disagreements which the political parties did have centered upon the degree of control
and length of time necessary to prepare the Filipinos for indeperndience. Republicans (who
were in office) wanted to administer the colony by using large numbers of American
administrators in an extended preparatory period. The Democrats (who were in opposition)
wanted to work on a shorter time-line and quickly grant control of the archipelago to the
Filipinos. 38 Among the Filipinos many of the elite cast their lot with the Americans, but
other Filipinos continued their struggle for independence.
35. Karnow, Image, p. 134-135.
36. Agoncillo, Introduction, p. 155-156.
37. Agoncillo, Introduction, p. 160.
38. Sturtevant, "Philippine," p. 55.
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U.S. military commanders and government officials had little respect for Filipino
military skill or political initiatives. After U.S. forces took Manila from the Spanish,
American officers ordered Aguinaldo, an ally, to remove his men from around the city. To
add further insult, U.S. commanders refused Filipinos permission even to enter Manila
under threat of death. Denied entry into Manila, Aguinaldo again proclaimed independence
and was inaugurated President of his recently-established Malolos Republic on 23 January
1899.39 The event did not even elicit a response from the U.S. Government. The U.S.
Senate approved the treaty annexing the Philippines two days later.40 Although the
Filipinos had been suspicious of American intentions since Dewey's victory in Manila Bay,
they saw themselves more and more from this moment on as a conquered foe.41
B. THE AMERICAN-FILIPINO WAR
The Filipinos were humiliated by American heavy-handedness, and tensions
heightened while U.S. and Filipino forces faced-off in the Manila suburbs. On 4 February
1899, an incident involving the death of a Filipino soldier near an American sentry point
ignited the conflict known to Americans as the Philippine Insurrection, and to Filipinos as
the Filipino-American War. Within 24 hours, 3000 Filipinos and 59 Americans lay
dead. 42 The American army was out-numbered three to one, but was well organized, well
armed, and fielded many experienced Indian fighters. The crushing blow American
39. Gagelonia, Filipino, p. 162.
40. Vreeland, Handbook, p. 57.
4 1. Agoncillo, ,Introd.ion, p. 159.
42. Karnow, Imag, p. 139, 144.
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soldiers dealt Aguinaldo's army in the first day forced him to immediately propose a truce
and request the establishment of a buffer zone. The Americans refused.43
The first weeks of combat were a rout and in a few short months the significantly
reinforced U.S. Army decimated the Filipino forces. The war quickly became one-sided,
but the military engagements nevertheless remained deadly, and the treatment of prisoners
by both sides became vicious and cruel. By November 1899, the war had been reduced to
a simple manhunt for Aguinaldo.
In retreat, Aguinaldo forces reverted to guerilla tactics, and the nature of the guerilla
warfare trapped soldiers on both sides in a ceaseless cycle of atrocity and retribution. By
the time President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed victory in 1902, two hundred thousand
Filipinos lay dead. The overwhelming majority were civilians.4 Approximately 4,000
American soldiers had been killed. 45 Naturally, the war (or the insurrection) only
aggravated the social, economic and political grievances that the Filipinos felt toward their
new conqueror.
On the run for over two years, Aguinaldo and his guerilla force managed to avoid
capture. On 23 March 1902, eighty badly needed Filipino reinforcements marched into
Aguinaldo's camp with five American enlisted prisoners. The event was a charade. The
prisoners were in fact American officers and the reinforcements were Filipino mercenaries,
ethnically different from Aguinaldo's forces. The American forces surprised Aguinaldo
43. Kamow, Image, p. 154-155, 159.
44. Karnow, Image, p. 140, 157.
45. Otto Johnson, The 1988 Information Please Almanac (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1988) p. 312.
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and quickly captured him and his men.4 6 Filipinos had betrayed their countrymen once
again and the "divide and rule" methods employed so effectively by the Spanish began to
work for the Americans.
Even before U.S. forces had captured Aguinaldo and subdued his guerillas in the hills
of northern Luzon47 , the American military governors had enjoyed a measure of success in
pacifying the remainder of the Philippines. Pacification implied restoration of law and
order; it did not necessarily mean any rectification of existing social ills. By May 1899, the
Filipino elite had already abandoned Aguinaldo to collaborate with the Americans.48 The
elite had returned to a familiar pattern, one rooted in Spanish times which emphasized close
ties between the elite and the colonial master and meant subjugation for the Filipino
peasants. The Muslims in the south also acquiesced to U.S. domination because, unlike
the Spanish, the Americans allowed them to practice Islam freely.
In addition to pacification, American military governors worked diligently to lay the
proper foundation for a new nation. Aware of the plight of the under privileged, they
viewed education as a way to improve the lives of peasants and foster appreciation for the
American presence. American soldiers were among the teachers who tried to "win the
hearts and minds" of the Filipino people. This education program may have been the
American military's greatest lasting contribution to the Filipino people and it is no
coincidence that similar methods were later practiced in Vietnam.49
46. David Howard Bain, Sitting in Darkness (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1984) p. 22. Karnow, Image, p. 182-183.
47. Karnow, mgg, p. 182-183.
48. Agoncillo, Introduction, p. 168. Karnow, Lu=, p. 156.
49. Agoncillo, Introduction, p. 183.
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C. AMERICAN CIVIL AUTHORITY
The colonial administration passed from military to civil authorities in 1901, with the
passage of the Spooner Amendment.50 William Howard Taft was appointed the first
civilian governor-general and, true to the Democratic party, set out to administer "the
Philippines for the Filipinos." 5 1 With great vigor he improved upon the infrastructure
already laid down by the U.S. military. The Philippines soon enjoyed improved public
health, communication, transportation and government institutions.5 2 These institutions
were valuable contributions to the Philippines, but the American efforts also perpetuated the
Filipinos' reliance on a foreign power.
American health programs, business practices and central government control
established a safe environment for the creation of new wealth in the Philippines. However,
there were negative repercussions rising from these improvements: startling population
increases, ruthless business practices and a more powerful elite.53 The improvements
allowed many Filipinos to live a more comfortable life, but the joys of the elite did not filter
down to the peasants. The daily life of a typical peasant became more difficult and
increased the dissatisfaction on the part of those who were aware of the growing disparities
between the rich and the poor.
The health programs established by the Americans improved the quality of life for
many Filipinos, but they also created the unforeseen population explosion. Between 1903
50. Agoncillo, Philippines, p. 151.
51. Daniel B. Schirmer and Stephen Rosskamm Shalom, The Philippines Reader: A
History of Colonialism. Neocolonialism. Dictatorship and Resistance (Boston: South End
Press, 1987) p. 43.
52. Sturtevant, "Philippine," p. 55-56.
53. Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the
Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977) p. 17.
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and 1939 the Philippine population grew from 7 million to 16 million. The domestic
agrarian system could not effectively absorb the rapidly expanding work force because the
number of landowners and the acreage under cultivation had not increased. The application
of simple supply and demand theory to these circumstances indicates that peasants would
be in aggressive competition for jobs on the haciendas and landowners would be in
position to demand more of their peasants. Both occurred.5
The proliferation of American business practices in the Philippines would prove to be a
double edged sword. Capitalism existed during the Spanish era, but the system matured
only with the arrival of the Americans. Land ownership became more than just a badge of
the aristocracy, it became a business venture. As a consequence, land speculation and
efficient farming practices accelerated the creation of wealth. A cash economy quickly
evolved and haciendas began to change hands. New landowners felt less obligated to long-
time tenants and consequently demanded greater productivity from them. As the haciendas
became extraordinarily productive, only the elite prospered.
The landed elite led a luxurious life even by international standards while the tenants
were barely subsisting. Landowners became ruthless in their methods and learned to
efficiently extract more from the peasants, give them less in return, and pass to them any
losses incurred by the hacienda. 55 The wealthier they became, the more American they
professed themselves to be. But, the peasants and the agricultural landless did not share
the elites' prosperity.
The increasing political control exercised by the central government at Manila enhanced
the landowner's position and power in the local community. In the traditional system, a
54. Kerkvliet, Huk, p. 18.
55. Kerkvliet, Hujj, p. 17-18, 20.
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landowner was a senior partner of sorts to the tenant and was obligated to provide the
continuous use of his land and the basics of life in return for labor. The landlord was
motivated to do this because much of his power was generated from tenant loyalty. Under
the American system, landownership and the legal title to property held a position far above
the traditional rights of tenants. This meant in a dispute over a tenant's right to continuous
use of the land, the landowner held all legal rights and could even call upon the central
government to enforce those rights. 56 Therefore, the landed elite became more powerful
through central government support while the utility of tenant loyalty became less
significant. With their stronger position, the elite took advantage of the rapidly growing
labor market, became even more ruthless in their business practices, and made the already
grim life of the peasantry more difficult.
D. PEASANT UNREST
American efforts in the Philippines may not have been ideal, but compared to
European colonial practices they were the model of enlightenment. 57 The American
colonial administration had been reasonably successful and unrest among the peasants did
not reach a critical stage until the 1920s.5 8 In the depression which followed the
expansiveness of WWI, disorganized rebellions began to surface throughout the
Philippines. 59 In the 1920s, a rebellious religious movement not unlike the Bohol
Rebellion of 1622 began to flourish on Mindanao. The movement revolved around a
religious leader who masqueraded as Jose Rizal. In the charade, Rizal had been resurrected
56. Kerkvliet, Huk, p. 21-23.
57. Karnow, Image, p. 197.
58. Sturtevant, "Philippine," pp. 123, 125.
59. Kessler, Rebellion, pp. 28-31.
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to win independence for the Philippines. In 1923, the movement turned violent, but was
put down by the Americans at the cost of one hundred lives.60 The rebellion was labelled
a religious fana:, -. movement, or Colorum. Colorum referred to a nineteenth century cult
which combined Christian teachings with indigenous mystic religious concepts. Colorum
movements typically involved charismatic leaders claiming mystical powers or knowledge.
The term "Colorum" evolved until it became synonymous with lawless or unorthodox
beliefs and behavior. 61
In March 1923, Pedro Kabola, a field worker in central Luzon with Colorum appeal, 62
organized a secret society, the Kapisanan Makabola Makarinag or "Association of the
Worthy Kabola," to defend peasants from the theft of their property by the landed elite.
The movement grew to 12,000 members by 1924.63 Kabola called a Kapisanan meeting to
finalize plans for a March 1925 revolutionary assault on San Jose in Nueva Ecija province.
Six colonial constabulary soldiers interrupted the meeting, killed Kabola in the melee and
captured 75 conspirators. Fear of a general uprising spread and more conspirators were
arrested, but the panic faded and 76 were jailed for conspiracy and seditious acts.64
Governor-general Leonard Wood attributed the uprising to unhealthy agrarian
conditions. He stated, "Behind the revolt were homesteaders who lost their farms and
tenants with grievances against landlords." 65 The official investigating committee was
60. Sturtevant, "Philippine," p. 128.
61. Sturtevant, "Philippine," p. 113.
62. Kessler, Rebellion, p. 12.
63. R. M. Stubbs, "Philippine Radicalism: The Central Luzon Uprisings, 1925-
1935" (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1951) p. 37.
64. Sturtevant, "Philippine," pp. 128,131.
65. Stubbs, "Radicalism," p. 48.
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comprised of Filipino elites and, not surprisingly, they disagreed with the governor-
general. The committee determined the uprising was caused by agitators such as Kabola
who disrupted the traditional landlord-tenant relationship and ignorant peasants who made
unreasonable demands. 66
The Tayug, Pangasinan incident of 1931 was led by a rice field laborer, Pedro Calusa,
and would be the last Colorum uprising. Two former Kapisanan members joined Calusa to
establish a secret society. The three devised a plan to seize the town of Tayug, destroy all
land records and judicial documents, then proclaim independence. The membership grew
quickly because living conditions for peasants in Central Luzon were growing worse and
those who participated would be entitled to some of the confiscated property. On 11
January 1931, Calusa and his forces took Tayug and destroyed the government documents.
By the following day Constabulary reinforcements had captured Calusa, ending the most
successful challenge to American authority in Central Luzon. 67
When the uprising was put down, Governor-General Dwight F. Davis admitted there
were regions in the Philippines where tenants were justified in their grievances against the
landlords, but he did not believe Tayug to be one of the areas.68 The Filipino Secretary of
the Interior, Honorio Ventury, declared the Colorum movement "was a hash of religion,
politics, fanaticism and a little of everything else that can serve to inflame them."'69
However, a Christian Science Monitor reporter, Joseph R. Hayden, wrote,
66. Sturtevant, "Philippine," p. 131-132.
67. Sturtevant, "Philippine," pp. 143-151.
68. New York Times, 22 January 1931.
69. Sturtevant, "Philippine," p. 150.
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"The reasons why the Filipino leaders did not wish the Tayug incident to be
investigated by a body containing the appropriate members of the Governor
General's staff of advisors are obvious. Such an inquiry would inevitably be pushed
into the whole realm of the oppression of the poor peasant by the local boss, the
usurer, the Constabulary, and the local official." 70
He wrote further,
"...one of the highest officials in Government, a Filipino, declared to the writer
that the Tayug incident should not be called an agrarian uprising because the use of
the term might very well give rise to similar outbreaks elsewhere in the Islands." 71
One may reject the disorganized Colorum rebellions of the early 1920s as fanatical
religious movements; but, the creation of the Kapisanan in 1923 and Calusa's Colorum
society in 1929 were sincere responses to the unfair treatment of peasants. As the unrest
progressed into the early 1930s a definite pattern emerged. The pattern indicated that the
plight of the peasants in relation to the elites was increasingly grim and that the peasants
had reached their breaking point. After the Tayug Incident the peasants would no longer
strike out in blind fury, but instead they would build a well-organized peasant movement:
the Sakdal Party.
E. THE SAKDALS
The arrival of the Sakdals would signal a new era of unrest in the Philippines. Its
leader, Benigno Ramos, was a strongly nationalistic, well educated middle class civil
service employee whose journalistic and oratory skills earned him a place in the ruling
Nacionalista party.72 Ramos' government career began in 1921, but was cut short in 1930
when the President of the Senate, Manuel Quezon, asked for his resignation. Ramos had
70. Ralston Hayden, "Cooperation in the Philippines Found to Carry its Penalties,"
Chri5tian Science Monitor, 12 September 1931.
71. Hayden, "Cooperation."
72. Sturtevant, "Philippine," p. 155-156.
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publicly condemned the Nacionalista party and its leaders for their support in the
appointment of a decidedly racist American to a teaching position at Manila High School.73
Ramos bitterly resented his dismissal and in October 1930, responded by establishing an
anti-Nacionalista paper, the Sakda.
The Tagalog term "sakdal" meant "to accuse" or "to strike," 74 and Ramos lived up to
the name when he quickly struck out against colonial rule by fanning the flames of
discontent in the 1931 Tangulan Uprising. The uprising was minor and easily controlled,
but the government revoked Sakdal's mailing privileges for its subversive activity. When
the government permitted Ramos to put his paper back in circulation in 1932, Sakdal
regained its readership in one short year. Feeling the support of the people, Ramos took
advantage of a growing rift among the Nacionalistas and established the Sakdal Party.75
The Sakdal Party built a reputation for supporting the disadvantaged and focused upon
two key objectives: absolute independence for the Philippines by 31 December 1935; the
partition of large haciendas and the distribution of that land to the poor.76 The Sakdal's
appeal to the masses reached its peak strength in the June 1934 elections; unfortunately for
the Sakdal's, much of their success was due to the Nacionalistas' inability to unite. When
the Nacionalista Party leadership realized the Sakdal Party posed a serious challenge, they
quickly resolved their internal differences thereby eliminating any chance for Sakdal Party
rule.77
73. Kessler, Rebellion, p. 14.
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Having lost hope for effecting political change, Ramos used Sakdal and his association
with the Japanese and their "Pan Asia" movement to reignite the flames of unrest in the
provinces surrounding Manila. He focused upon the 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act:78 an act
which provided for a ten year transitional commonwealth government, the restriction of
Filipino immigration to the U.S., and the continuance of trade practices favorable to the
U.S.. Even with these provisions, Ramos believed the act was a ruse to prolong American
rule and forever frustrate Philippine independence. 79
On 2 and 3 May 1935, peasant revolt erupted in the four provinces surrounding
Manila, driving the horrified elite into the city for protection. Once again the peasants were
confronting the elite. The revolt may have been well organized when compared with earlier
peasant uprisings in the Philippines, but the poorly armed and poorly led peasants were still
no match for the American colonial administration. The Sakdal Uprising was put down
and hope for improved working and living conditions died along with sixty peasant
rebels.8 0
The efforts of the Sakdalistas were not totally in vain because government officials like
Commonwealth President Manuel Quezon began to identify socioeconomic factors as the
source of peasant unrest. The Nacionalistas even called for measures to restrict landowner
abuse of tenants, and they supported social reforms to attack peasant discontent at its root.
For the first time, Filipinos in position of authority were looking for the root cause of
discontent and not blaming ignorance and religious fanaticism for the unrest.81
78. Schirmer, Reader, p. 37, 55, 57-58, 69.
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What were the long-term effects of the Sakdal Uprising? The R.P. Government
implemented reform measures, but the landowners worked against the measures by closing
ranks. They organized private armies and implemented tough programs to restrict peasant
movement. Opposing the landowners were agrarian leaders who saw that direct
confrontation with the government was deadly so they organized peasant unions and
decided to settle their grievances through strikes and political activity. The peasant and
landowner initiatives were fundamentally opposed and the two social classes were on a
course which would collide after WWII.
F. THE HUKS AND THE PKP
The social dynamics which led to the creation of the Sakdal movement also engendered
a communist movement in the Philippines. A communist effort to gain control of social
revolt had been periodically active in the Philippines since Crisanto Evangelista established
the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) or Philippine Communist Party in 1930.82
What was different about this communist organization was the leadership indicated they
would not serve as an arm of an international communist movement. In fact, when the PKP
merged with the Socialist Party of the Philippines (SPP) in 1938,83 the alliance sought not
to bring the Philippines a "Russian brand of communism," but instead to secure an
equitable division of the fruits of labor for tenant farmers. Pedro Abad Santos, the
82. Jose Maria Sison, The Philippine Revolution: The Leader's View (New York:
Crane Russak, 1989) p. 200.
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PKP/SPP merger party vice-chairman, said he would welcome capitalism in the Philippines
if it could just restructure the unfair distribution of wealth. 84
The PKP/SPP was just one organization among many like the Sakdals which pursued
moderate peasant objectives generally through nonviolent courses of action.85 During their
pre-WWII struggle, the peasants may have been idealists, but they were not ordinary
communist ideologues. Further, their revolution did not begin to attract the widespread
support of more recent conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. The focus of unrest was not a
struggle for hard-line communist ideology, but instead a fight for practical agrarian reform
against the landed elite and the economic injustices they perpetuated. In their struggle, the
peasants were anti-American only to the extent that the U.S. Government was close to the
landlords and the wealthy.
Evidence of nationalist and not ideological motives came at the beginning of WWII
when the PKP/SPP merger party pledged full support and loyalty to the U.S. in the war
against Japan. 86 During the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, much of the merger
party senior leadership was either imprisoned or executed. 87 In addition, the PKP/SPP
was able to link with the People's Anti-Japanese army (or Hukbalahap) and effectively
support the American war effort. 88 During the war, the Huks were dedicated to agrarian
reform, but the fight against the Japanese was their first priority. Communist ideology
84. Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the
Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977) p. 53.
85. Kerkvliet, Rebellion, p. 39.
86. Sison, Revolution, p. 41.
87. Richard J. Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1989) p. 31.
88. Vreeland, Handbook, p. 439.
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played only a small role in a few of the units which had come together to comprise the
Hukbalahap. 89
The PKP/SPP linked with the Hukbalahap, but the movements were not one and the
same. The Hukbalahap was essentially a loose confederation of many anti-landlord peasant
organizations brought together to fight against the Japanese occupation. The landlords
were almost universally Japanese collaborators. The PKP/SPP was just one of these
organizations. It is true that a few guerilla training sessions held by the Huks included
Marxist instruction; however, former Huk rebels affirm that Marxism was taught in only a
few sessions, and not many among the peasants understood or saw the relevance of the
instruction.90
At the close of WWII, General Douglas MacArthur's intelligence staff warned him the
Huks might seek a Soviet-style communist government for the Philippines. However,
MacArthur sympathized with the peasants and refused to send armed force against them
saying, "If I worked in those sugar fields, I'd be a Huk myself." On the other hand,
MacArthur was also very loyal to his Filipino friends among the power elite and permitted
piecemeal repression of the Huk peasants. 9 1 (Especially after the war against the Japanese
had ended.)
When MacArthur left to command the occupation of Japan, the Huks returned to the
haciendas to again become subject to political and economic mistreatment at the hands of
the landed elite. 92 At first, the Huks fought the tenancy system with "the ballot and
89. Kerkvliet, Rebellion, pp. 84-86.
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petition," working toward an industrialized capitalist economy which would put an end to
the feudal agricultural system. 93 The humiliation suffered by the Huks, a group which had
fought bravely in WWII, coupled with the availability of weapons at the close of the war to
create an environment ripe for rebellion in the soon to be independent Philippines.94
The Americans can be accurately characterized as having been benevolent, but
condescending in their administration of the Philippines. They did build a modem national
infrastructure for the Philippines and from the beginning of their rule, like no other colonial
master, the Americans made independence for their colonial subjects a stated goal. The
Americans, in their methods of colonial administration, may have fundamentally differed
with the Spanish in their system of rule, but the U.S. nevertheless managed to make many
of the same mistakes. The Americans co-opted the elite, as had the Spanish, then permitted
them to continue to control the daily lives of the peasants as they had for hundreds of years.
The Americans were unable to solve the problem of peasant unrest in the Philippines.
When the Filipinos gained independence, would the elites who controlled the reigns of
power prove any more effective at pacifying peasant unrest?
93. Karnow, Image, p. 340.
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IV. EARLY PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE (1946-1957)
The social-economic problems of the underprivileged Filipino masses became indelibly
linked to the problems of nationalism when the Philippines became independent. Since the
old elites continued in actual control of Philippine politics, the national interests of the
United States naturally came to be identified with the interests of the Philippine elite. The
"special" relationship the U.S. would have with the elite-led government would leave the
peasants out in the cold, neglected both by their own government and the United States.
The peasants would rise again in protest, but this time they would be fighting a Filipino
government.
A. SPECIAL RELATIONS
On 4 July 1946, the U.S. relinquished sovereignty of its colony to the Republic of the
Philippines. After 350 years of foreign domination Filipinos finally had their
independence; however, the military, social and economic ties which bound the Philippines
to the United States were not as quickly severed with the ties of national sovereignty.
Fortunately, the mutual struggle by the Americans and Filipinos against the Japanese
created a reservoir of good will, making the transition to independence relatively smooth
and even gratifying for both nations. This good will would set the stage for a "special"
relationship between the U.S. and R.P.; a relationship which would be useful in the
immediate aftermath of WWII as the R.P. continued to face social unrest and the U.S.
struggled against the perceived threat of global communism.
When the first President of the Commonwealth, Manuel Quezon, died in August 1944,
his Vice-President, Sergio Osmena, became President. However, the war and its
immediate aftermath found General MacArthur in a position of near omnipotence in the
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Philippines, and consequently Osmena was ineffectual during his term in office. Osmena
was easily defeated in his bid for reelection when MacArthur openly supported his
opponent, Manuel Roxas. In April 1946, Roxas was elected President of the
Commonwealth, and in July became the first President of an independent Philippines.
Roxas was immediately challenged with the Philippine Trade Act controversy, the defense
arrangements with the U.S. and the grievances of some newly formed peasant unions.
The Philippine Trade Act of 1946 was an agreement between the U.S. and Philippines
in which the U.S. would provide large amounts of postwar reconstruction money to the
R.P. (promised by the Tydings Rehabilitation Act), if the R.P. would extend to the
Americans the favored trading status they had enjoyed since 1909. This meant that
Philippine markets would be open to American manufacturers, and U.S. citizens would
have parity with Filipinos to exploit the resources of the Philippines. The Filipinos would
have to amend their constitution to enforce this measure. The remnant Huks saw
Philippine submission to this American demand as an affront to their sovereignty. Many
Filipinos accused the Americans of conspiring with the Roxas administration-the new
elites-to deprive the Huks of their seats in Congress, which if granted would have enabled
them to thwart the passage of the Philippine Trade Act.95
The act may have seemed one-sided in favor of U.S. interests and its passage may
have been less than pure, but American businessmen were unwilling to risk investment in
the redevelopment of the R.P. without a U.S. government guarantee that they would earn a
worthwhile return on their investment. The amendment was passed, the R.P. received the
desperately needed reconstruction money, and the "special" relationship between the
Americans and the Filipinos continued in fact, if not in name.
95. Kerkvliet, Rebellion, pp. 150-151.
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In 1947, the "special" relationship between the U.S. and R.P. was formalized with the
signing of two agreements: the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) and Military Assistance
Agreement (MAA). The Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) would follow in 1951. In the
Philippine view, these agreements in effect exchanged a degree of Philippine sovereignty
for a defense arrangement with the U.S.. They were right.
The MBA provided the Americans unrestricted use of military bases in the Philippines
for 99 years and, with justification, many Filipinos would later argue that this agreement
was an insult to their national sovereignty because it relinquished "extraterritorial" rights to
the Americans. The MAA was a five-year, renewable agreement which accompanied the
MBA and provided the "training and aid" intended to build a military force in the R.P..
The MAA was seen by many as an American payment for the generous provisions in the
MBA. 96
In 1951, the Filipinos insisted upon a MDT because they wanted the Americans to be
obligated to defend the Philippines against attack, presumably from Japan. 97 The treaty did
recognize that an attack in the Pacific region on either the U.S. or R.P. would be a threat to
both nations; however, the treaty did not commit the U.S. beyond calling for the Americans
to act in accordance with their "constitutional processes. ' '98
Each of the three agreements in the comprehensive defense arrangement were freely
signed by the U.S. and R.P.. From this arrangement, the R.P. received a great deal of
desperately needed financial and military support, but the Americans had bargained for and
received rights considered important for implementation of their own national interests.
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Collectively, the agreements benefitted both nations, designed as they were for the mutual
defense of both nations.
B. PEASANT UNREST
Another problem President Roxas would face in 1946 was social unrest. During
WWII, the peasants had fought bravely under difficult circumstances, but when the war
came to a close they once again began to articulate their demands for agrarian reform. Luis
Taruc, a long-time organizer in the peasant union movement and Huk Supremo during
WWII, pleaded for peasants rights and an opportunity for power-sharing. 99 President
Roxas refused Taruc's pleas and cracked down ruthlessly on Taruc, the peasant unions,
and the general peasant population. The peasant population willingly provided their
allegiance to Taruc when he and many of his followers fled deeper into the countryside to
establish an armed anti-government movement.'10
The deep-seeded rivalry between the elite and the peasants resurfaced as the Huk
Rebellion. However, for the first time, the peasants were also challenging an independent
Philippine government. But the Americans too were involved because they were so closely
linked to the elite-led government. The Huk rebellion was confined to Luzon. However,
similar movements flared throughout the islands, but they did not receive much attention
either from the Philippine central government or its American backers.
After Roxas' untimely death in 1948, his successor, Elpidio Quirino, tried to win over
the Huks through negotiation and an amnesty program. Quirino's attempts at reconciliation
with the Huks failed and the rebellion only grew worse. 10 1
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The Huks overwhelmingly consisted of poor peasants fighting for land reform rather
than ideological revolution. According to Stanley Karnow, an old Huk rebel recounted
that,
"They said we were Communists. I didn't even know what Communism was, and
I still don't. But they called you a Communist and that was that. It made no sense to
deny it, because they wouldn't believe you."1 02
The peasants opposed the abuses of feudalism, but they were not sufficiently sophisticated
to oppose the concept of feudalism. As patronizing as it may sound, the peasants simply
wanted to work for benevolent landowners. The peasants were concerned with
nationalism, but only to the extent that the Americans were identified with their government
oppressors. 10 3 Ideological controversy had little attraction for a people who were still
struggling to overcome the bitter heritage of war. Unfortunately, American intelligence
gave another reading to Huk intentions and reported that a vigorous peasant movement
would "seek to further the objectives of world communism." 1°4
C. THE INSURGENCY AND MAGSAYSAY
The U.S. government continued to side with the Philippine power elite because from
Washington, communism in Asia appeared to be an insidious monolith. 105 The U.S.
implemented a two-part policy. First, the Quirino-Foster agreement was designed to
provide economic support to the government, and that support was to trickle down to the
masses--it never did. Second, the CIA and military were to help Ramon Magsaysay
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(Quirino's Defense Minister who would later become President) formulate tactics to defeat
the Huks.
Magsaysay and the CIA defeated the Huks, but the Quirino-Foster agreement was
never used as designed--to help erase the causes of poverty and the massive growing gap
between the rich and poor. Magsaysay employed aggressive anti-guerilla tactics against the
Huks, and some sources may indicate differently, but in an in-depth review in Rebellion
and Repression in the Philippines, Richard J. Kessler states these tactics contributed least
to their. 10 6 Benedict J. Kerkvliet suggests war weary peasants and reform promises from
Magsaysay accounted for two-thirds of his success in neutralizing the Huks. 107
The reforms Magsaysay promised the peasants, and the failure of vicious revenge
attacks poorly conceived by the Huks, enabled Magsaysay to win peasant allegiance for the
government. 10 8 With the peasants on the side of the government, R.P. forces were able to
arrest the members of the PKP/SPP politburo in October 1950.109 By December 1952, the
PKP had renounced armed struggle and embraced legal opposition as their only means for
attaining political change in the future. 110 However, Magsaysay never followed through
on his reform promises and the rich became richer and the poor became poorer.
The PKP renounced armed struggle, but Luis Taruc and a few Huk units continued
their fight for agrarian reform. The link between the PKP/SPP and the Huks which had
been formed during WWII was broken, and the two movements were separate again. The
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Huks did change their name to the communist-sounding People's Liberation Army, but
they remained focused on settling scores with landlords, and their allies and stooges in the
Philippine government.111
The Magsaysay strategy continued to wear down the Huks, and eventually the rebels
were unable to remain in the field as an effective fighting force. In the eyes of the Huks,
reform justice had never been achieved and a few guerillas continued fighting in scattered
units under the leadership of Taruc. 1 12 However, many chose not to follow Taruc and
began to use their fighting skills for criminal activity. These men would later become
founding members in the New People's Army (NPA). 113
In 1953, Magsaysay became President of the Philippines. His leadership during the
R.P. fight against the Huks had made him very popular. However, Magsaysay's
popularity did not translate into effective execution of the political and bureaucratic
responsibilities of government. Even Magsaysay began to view his own presidency as
anti-climatic, especially when compared to his hey-day when he defeated the Huks. He
began to suffer criticism from Philippine nationalists who time and again would refer to
him as "America's boy in Asia." Magsaysay was unable to fulfill his promises of agrarian
reform and the causes of rural poverty were as persistent as ever when Magsaysay died in a
plane crash in March 1957.114
The military defeat of the Huks appeared to be a success, but the U.S. and R.P. failed
to achieve their most important objective. The arms supplied by the U.S. did not make the
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Philippine military an effective instrument against an external enemy, neither did they bring
peace or prosperity to the masses. Arms were the wrong medium for the social ills of the
Philippines, because weapons would not relieve the pain of the hungry.
Here was an advance warning of the powerlessness of power. We might have seen
that the Philippines needed something more than military assistance. Even though our
intentions and motives were good, we still did not achieve the results we wanted. As long
as the U.S. focused upon the "communist" threat, little thought was given to the possibility
that some fundamental changes in policy might be in order.
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V. BUDDING NATIONALISM (1957-1965)
The era of "Early Independence" was an awkward time for the Philippines; a time
when the R.P. groped for direction and had to rely upon the United States to play a major
role even in its internal affairs. The "special relationship" had already reached its peak
during the Magsaysay administration and the Philippine nationalists became increasingly
resentful as Magsaysay catered more and more to U.S. interests.
With the death of Magsaysay, the extreme nationalists moved to center stage. For the
first time, the Philippine leadership seized an opportunity to break free from the
omnipresent influence of the U.S. and find its own way in an era of "budding
nationalism." Unfortunately, corruption would accompany nationalism and a weak
Philippine economy would continue to require U.S. assistance. President Macapagal
would attempt to end the corruption and fail, but he would be successful in boosting
national pride.
A. NATIONALISM AND CORRUPTION
Magsaysay's Vice-President and successor, Carlos P. Garcia, would become known
for his aggressive nationalistic objectives and penchant for corrupt activity. As President,
Garcia blazed a new trail for national policy by rejecting the presumption of foreign
domination. His goal was clear: true political and fiscal independence for the Philippines.
He implemented a policy of economic nationalism which had been outlined three years
earlier by the National Economic Council. 115 This policy was labelled "Filipino First,"
115. Buss, The Arc, p. 135.
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and with its implementation Garcia intended to resist foreign control and ensure the national
interests of the R.P. took priority above all else--in particular American interests. 116
Austerity was also a key component in Garcia's plan and he articulated a regimen of
"more work, more thrift, more productive investment and more efficiency." 117 He
believed "extravagant consumption" must be stopped and that austerity in the daily lives of
Filipinos was a "desirable end in itself." Garcia's rhetoric was both an appeal to
nationalism and a call for national self-sufficiency, but apparently Garcia did not intend for
either his "Filipino First" policy or austerity program to harm the elite.
Critics sarcastically labelled Garcia's policy "Some Filipinos First" 118 because while
he preached austerity, Garcia and his cronies were managing a system of graft and
corruption that would only be surpassed when Marcos raped the nation. In one scheme,
Garcia managed to accumulate $700 million in a twelve month period. 119 Unfortunately,
Garcia had set an example that his people would follow. More than ever, corruption
infected people in every social class, and reached into every facet of Filipino life. Teodoro
Locsin of the Manila Free Press lamented,
"We are no better than our leaders, we put them where they are and were we in
their place, we might do as they do. Weakness is a matter of opportunity. We do not
hate corruption, we hate our lack of a share.' 120
It was not long before this degree of corruption would wreak havoc on the Philippine
economy.
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B. U.S. ASSISTANCE
As nationalism took root under Garcia and Macapagal, the U.S. military bases and aid
and assistance programs increasingly became points of conflict. Since the signing of the
MBA in 1947, the U.S. and R.P. relationship proceeded with the understanding that the
system of military bases should continue so long as both nations considered it in their
common interests and to their mutual advantage. 12 1 The U.S. acknowledged R.P.
sovereignty over the bases in 1956, but in practice, the U.S. continued to use the bases
largely for its own national security and for the security and defense of those nations with
parallel interests. The Americans used the bases in 1954 to support the French in their
efforts at Dien Bien Phu, and again in 1958 to help the Republic of China in their
sponsorship of the Indonesian rebels.1 22 Some Filipino nationalists were irritated by these
abuses of R.P. sovereignty, but most Filipinos were reassured by the presence of U.S.
forces. In the view of some, the Americans were taking advantage of the Filipinos; but
was it the Americans' responsibility to look after the national interests of the Philippines
even before their own?
The R.P. government officials continued to abide by the MBA; therefore, they at least
tacitly agreed to their predicament. However, it was a bitter pill to swallow. The R.P.
government leadership knew their interests were just one small variable in the American
calculus of national security, and this realization humiliated them. However, they also
knew that if the need to defend the R.P. against an outside aggressor were ever to arise,
they would have to rely upon the Americans.
The R.P. enjoyed support other than military protection. Beginning with the
Rehabilitation Act of 1946 and ending in the Garcia administration, the U.S. provided $3
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billion in aid and assistance to the R.P.: $1 billion in grants, loans and credits; $1 billion in
payments and expenditures resulting from WWII; and $1 billion in military aid. 123 The
program was generous by any measure. In comparison, the Marshall Plan for the whole of
Europe totalled $13 billion. 124 Nevertheless, R.P. government officials continued to
complain that the aid did not even cover their losses during the war and that too much of
what was provided was in the form of military equipment. The Filipinos may have
achieved political independence, but their desperate need for financial assistance left them
with "hat in hand" in front of the Americans.
In the era of "budding nationalism" in the Philippines the United States was no longer
responsible for R.P. internal security, but "special relations" and U.S. national interests
continued to prescribe active American support. At that time worlJ :crr.Aunism was what
the American government feared most, and it seemed to take root in poverty stricken
nations like the Philippines. The Americans believed Garcia and his policies were
responsible for the failure of the Philippine economy, and if poverty were to grow out of
that failure, it would ultimately revive the Huk Rebellion. 125 The Americans perceived the
Huk Rebellion to be a wholly communist inspired movement, and since the U.S. was
willing o (:- anything to strengthen its position against communism in the Cold War,
Philippine nationalism had to be endured.
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C. A PRESIDENT FOR THE COMMON MAN
In 1961, Garcia lost the Presidential election to his very own Vice-President, Diosdado
Macapagal. The Americans backed Macapagal in his run for office, but he needed little
help. As President, Garcia had humiliated his Vice-President at every opportunity, but
Macapagal managed to turn the tables on Garcia by advertising himself as sober, frugal and
above corruption--the antithesis of what Garcia's presidency had come to mean. Further,
for a campaign which targeted corruption, Macapagal held impeccable credentials and had
an unusual distinction for a Filipino President; he was from a poor peasant family. His
campaign slogan read, "Honest Mac, the Poor Man's Best Friend." 126
With Macapagal as President, the "Filipino First" policy lost much of its extremism.
He counseled the Filipinos to be realistic in their nationalism and understand that "the
power of our economic development is in the hands of the United States. 1 27 The R.P.'s
withering economy would become Macapagal's first priority.
To rebuild the economy Macapagal set into motion a five point plan to attack
corruption on all fronts: set a personal example of honesty and integrity for the nation to
follow; attain self-sufficiency for the nation in food, clothing and shelter; create jobs so
Filipinos could earn the money to secure basic needs; launch an omnibus socioeconomic
program for prosperity; establish practices and examples to strengthen morality. 12 8
Macapagal's plan was all-encompassing, but it was also naively optimistic and as a result
its benefits never trickled down to the Philippines' poor.
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Macapagal's program for economic recovery did not take root, but he still managed to
tap the well of national pride when he changed the celebration of Independence Day from
July 4th to July 12th. 129 Nationalists were pleased because in their view July 12th, the
date Aguinaldo declared independence from Spain, was an honorable Independence Day.
The Filipinos generally liked their association with the Americans, but to them, July 4th
was the American Independence Day and simply the date that President Harry S. Truman
relinquished sovereignty of the colony to the R.P.. Macapagal's initiative was widely
popular and for a time drew the Filipino people closer as a nation.
In another effort to make a lasting contribution to his people, Macapagal implemented a
land reform code. Macapagal remembered his roots and refused to ignore the plight of the
peasants. His land reform code had six provisions: establish and encourage the formation
of family-sized farms as the basis of Philippine agriculture; improve the status of poor
farmers by freeing them from pernicious practices such as illegal rates of interests;
encourage bigger productivity to increase the income of small farmers; apply all labor laws
to all irrespective of their status in life; provide a land settlement program and the
distribution of land; make poor farmers independent, self-reliant, and responsible citizens
in order to strengthen Philippine democratic society. 130 Unfortunately, Macapagal's
program as all other land reform promises in the past never progressed beyond the paper
stage.
At the end of his administration, Macapagal could be seen as an honest man who
worked to invigorate nationalism, create a self-sufficient economy and bring positive
change in the distribution of wealth. He was only reasonably successful in instilling
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130. Agoncillo, Introduction, 238-239.
43
national pride. The landed elite were enraged by his agrarian reform proposals and the
peasants were disappointed by his failure. Further, Macapagal may have been personally
honest, but he was unable to curb corruption in his administration. By 1965, corruption
and mismanagement had not released its grip on the economy, and unemployment and
inflation were on the rise.' 31 Macapagal's track record as President was marginal at best
and in the 1965 election he would be little competition for a savvy politician like Ferdinand
Marcos. Above all, the ever increasing poverty in the city slums and the countryside
aggravated to the bursting point the differences between the elite and the disaffected.
131. Karnow, Image, p. 365.
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VI. THE MARCOS YEARS (1965-1986)
In the Philippines, the affairs of the nation were spinning out of control. The internal
turmoil of the Macapagal government, evidenced by its inability to cope with a wide range
of domestic problems, provided an opportunity for a strong national leader to fill the void.
Ferdinand E. Marcos would be that leader and for the next 20 years rule the Philippines.
Marcos was the quintessential Filipino politician. He would promise a better life to the
peasants, fight the communist movement, and deal effectively with the Americans. Marcos
would construct a house of cards using martial law and state capitalism as his tools, then
watch it collapse as Benigno and Cory Aquino inspired the Filipino people to revolution.
A. THE PROMISES OF MARCOS
In 1965, Marcos was a brilliant but tough minded Senator who had been in Philippine
national politics since his 1949 election to the legislature--an election characterized as the
dirtiest in Philippine history. In the 1965 presidential campaign, Marcos promised to
"renovate society, introduce land reform, social justice and real democracy."' 132 After a
convincing election victory over Macapagal, Marcos made an additional promise in his
inauguration speech to end "every form of waste or conspicuous consumption and
extravagance" in the nation and ensure the "supremacy of the law." 133 Marcos' promises
would be an anachronism in the reality of his presidency.
Marcos faced many challenges when he took office, and most serious among these
was the ever-present discontent of the peasants. To tackle the problem, Marcos announced
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agrarian reform initiatives and established programs designed to update the nation's
infrastructure. Land was to be distributed to peasants, roads and bridges were to be built,
and agricultural improvements were to be implemented.'3 Under Marcos, the Philippines
seemed to have a promising future.
Marcos' early efforts were directed at nurturing development, but as he settled
comfortably into power, the hopelessness which peasants experienced in the Magsaysay,
Garcia and Macapagal administrations, returned. Marcos' efforts at improving agricultural
techniques were successful, and for a time the Philippines became a net exporter of
food. 135 However, Marcos' land reform program fizzled quickly and soon Marcos was
reported to be amassing a fortune from the corruption in his own administration. To make
matters worse, the growing discontent among the peasants began to feed a rising tide of
nationalism in Manila; and when these events linked with the anti-American sentiment
stemming from the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, it created an environment ripe for the
emergence of a radical political movement. 136
B. THE INSURGENTS
The communist movement would take new life in this environment. The PKP had
been the focus of socialist reform in the Philippines since its split with the Huks in 1952,
but it lost its vitality with the passing years. In 1967, a PKP officer and university lecturer,
Jose Maria Sison, spurned the PKP for its passiveness and founded a new communist
party, the CPP. Sison and the other founding members of the CPP were verifiably middle
and upper class university students and their stated goal was to create a peasant-based
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armed revolution in the Philippines. 137 The year 1967 was the height of the cultural
revolution in China and the year of the Marcos commitment of Philippine forces to
Vietnam.
Sison and the fledgling CPP insisted they needed an army for their revolution and,
conveniently, the same Huk rebels who had resorted to banditry and racketeering in the
1950s were open for solicitation.1 38 Sison approached two experienced Huk guerilla
leaders for help: Faustino del Mundo (Commander Sumulong) and Bernabe Buscayno
(Commander Dante). Luis Taruc was no longer available because he had been arrested in
1954 and sentenced to 14 years in prison. Commander Sumulong assumed Taruc's
position as Huk Supremo because since his release, Taruc had become an ordinary peace-
loving citizen. 139
Commander Sumulong was living outside Clark Air Base in Angeles City and owned
the protection and smuggling rackets associated with the base. Commander Dante was
Sumulong's number one lieutenant; a man personally credited with committing 25
murders. 140 Sumulong did not join with Sison, but Dante felt that his aspirations for a
better life for Filipino peasants would be improved by linking up with Sison.141 Sison and
Dante cooperated, and by March 1969 they had created the New People's Army (NPA).
They compared themselves to the earlier leaders of the PKP/Huk: Sison, an urban
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intellectual, played the role of Crisanto Evangelista, and Commander Dante, a peasant,
played the role of Luis Taruc. 142
Initially, few elites participated in the communist movement, but those who did were
intellectuals and members of the CPP. The elites did not have a taste for the tougher life in
the NPA and consequently the NPA consisted almost exclusively of individuals from
peasant backgrounds. The social classes came together in the movement, but their goals
could neither be characterized as identical nor linked in perpetuity. The elites in the CPP
were motivated by ideology and wanted fundamental change in government whereas the
peasants in the NPA were motivated by practical objectives and wanted land reform.
The CPP founders also perceived themselves to be Maoists and they viewed the hard-
line model of the Cultural Revolution as the most effective way to introduce wholesale
political change in the Philippines. 143 They believed the CCP model would logically attract
widespread support from Filipino peasants because it implicitly promised agrarian reform.
C. MARCOS, THE AMERICANS, AND THE INSURGENCY
In the late 1960s, Marcos also began to play the theme of nationalism to his advantage
at home and abroad. He knew the American connection was of value to the Philippines
and, for a time, he agreed to cooperate with the Americans in Vietnam by providing the
Philippine Civil Action Group (PHILCAG)--a non-combative force whose second in
command was then Major Fidel Ramos. However, Marcos became increasingly cautious
as American embarrassments in Vietnam increased.
After the Tet offensive Marcos grew more ambivalent in his relationship with the
Americans and became the foremost Filipino spokesman for "respectable independence."
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First, he ordered the PHILCAG to return from Vietnam, then he began to probe for change
in the U.S.-R.P. relationship. His suggested initiatives included a review of the MBA, a
revision of the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty, and the termination of special
economic relations. Marcos further increased his options when he opened windows to the
socialist world and announced a "New Developmental Diplomacy" which divested the
Philippines from sole dependence on the United States. 144
While Marcos was distancing himself from the U.S., the CPP leadership was seeking
legitimacy for their struggle from the Chinese Communists. The CPP sent nine of their
own number to study in the PRC in 1971.145 Although Maoism was failing even in China,
the CPP and NPA still wanted to follow Mao's hard line; an idea which implied there was
no other way for communism to succeed except by force of arms. The Philippines was not
China and the Filipinos were not Chinese, but the NPA nevertheless employed a "Yenan
Strategy" to emulate Mao's success. In theory, from a headquarters in remote Northern
Luzon, the NPA would build a power base from which the movement was to advance in
stages until final victory in Manila.
As Sison conceived, the NPA needed mass base support; a sea of people in which his
guerilla army could swim. The development of "mass base" support and participation by
the peasants, workers, soldiers, parish priests and inteliectuals was crucial for the CPP
leadership to lead a successful revolution and supplant the elites in government. By 1972,
the CPP claimed to have several hundred guerillas, 350 rifles and a mass base of 300,000
sympathizers. On the other hand, Marcos estimated the NPA's armed strength to be much
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g-eater: 8000 guerillas, 10,000 rifles, but only 100,000 sympathizers. 146 Launching his
scheme to consolidate power, President Marcos used the exaggerated estimation of the
NPA threat as justification for declaring martial law in 1972.
D. MARTIAL LAW AND STATE CAPITALISM
Initially, many Filipinos welcomed martial law because its immediate effect was to
curtail dramatically the raging lawlessness and violence in their country. However, to
justify the declaration of martial law abroad, Marcos identified the NPA as an insurgency:
a definition which won further financial and military support from an American government
that was wrestling with a similarly defined conflict in Vietnam. Both were perceived by the
Americans to be manifestations of the worldwide communist movement. Marcos knew the
U.S. would disapprove of his abandonment of democracy, but he guessed correctly that
the Americans would accept martial law if the alternative was the rise of communism in the
R.P.. 147 The U.S. and the Marcos government seemed to have found a common cause.
For a time, the NPA was able t, implement its "Yenan Strategy" with little resistance
from the government, but in 1972, Marcos deployed the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) to crush the NPA. From 1972 through 1974, insurgent bases located mostly in the
Cordillera mountains of Northern Luzon were identified and destroyed. The AFP dealt the
NPA a major defeat and forced them to take on a strategy of simple survival.1 48 However,
even though his armed forces enjoyed extraordinary success against the NPA, Marcos was
unwilling to suspend martial law.
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A plan of economic reform, or "state capitalism," accompanied martial law in Marcos'
plan to consolidate power. Marcos took capital resources from members of the private
sector whom he disliked and redirected their resources into government "prestige" projects
in Manila. 149 He confiscated profitable grain, meat, fertilizer, sugar and coconut
enterprises then handed them over to his "cronies" (capital elitists who cooperated with
him) to be run as "state monopolies." 150 Marcos grew wealthy receiving "kickbacks" from
public contracts, and profits from the state monopolies. His tactics alienated many, but in
the short run, Marcos was able to effectively consolidate his power by nurturing a strong
allegiance among those who were benefitting from the corruption. In this fever of
corruption, the poverty of the masses was of little concern to Marcos.
The economic and political excesses of Marcos continued to feed domestic opposition.
The NPA regrouped after the debacle of its "Yenan Strategy," but suffered another major
setback when many in the CPP and NPA leadership, including Sison and Dante, were
arrested in 1976 and 1977.151 Even with this setback, the rolls of the NPA would
eventually exceed 20,000.152 The NPA's extraordinary recruiting success was due to the
near universal hatred of and opposition to the corrupt and ruthless tactics which Marcos'
troops employed against the guerillas and the peasants.
The mass base also expanded because many peasants who had become the innocent
victims of the hostilities were receiving no help or commiseration from their own
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constitutional government.' 5 3 However, it is significant to note that the mass base was
distinct from the NPA. The mass base was comprised of Filipinos who had been alienated
by the government and were providing active, passive and often unwitting support to the
NPA guerillas. However, neither active, passive, nor unwitting support can be equated to
ideological unity. The NPA was a vehicle through which the otherwise helpless mass base
could challenge Marcos.
As Marcos tightened his grip on the nation, many Filipinos began to interpret the
"special relationship" between the U.S. and R.P. governments as clear American support
for the Marcos dictatorship. In particular, the CPP saw American involvement in the
Philippines as that of an imperialist nation infringing upon Filipino sovereignty. These
views varied little with the ingrained belief among most Filipinos that the U.S. ultimately
controlled events in the Philippines. As a result, many Filipinos naturally, linked the
abuses of Marcos with the U.S. administration. As the U.S. became more and more a
target for blame, protest, and eventually violence, an increasing number of Americans
began to question the wisdom of the policy of all-out U.S. support for the Marcos regime.
Just like the peasant reaction to Roxas's methods in the 1950s, the peasants' suffering
under Marcos in the mid-1970s increased their support for the rebel movement. The vast
majority of those supporting the NPA, previously referred to as the "mass base," were not
doing so to promote communism as an ideology, but instead to oppose the excesses of
Marcos. It is clear that peasants who were not linked to the NPA often experienced a
greater degree of justice in the rudimentary practices of the NPA than they did with the
R.P. government. 154 Those who suffer seek relief wherever they can find it.
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E. U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
In 1979, while beginning to modify the structure of martial law and promising
restoration of democracy, Marcos agreed to a renewal of the MBA. In the new agreement,
the U.S. could still conduct unhampered military operations and exercise command and
control within certain facilities on the bases; but, ultimate sovereignty over the bases
remained with the R.P.. At the same time Marcos let it be known that he (pro-American as
he pretended to be) was not exactly happy with the MAA. Presidents Carter and Marcos
agreed to a new security package of $500 million for the period 1980-1985: $50 million in
military assistance; $250 million in foreign military sales; $200 million in security
supporting assistance. In 1983, Marcos made an agreement with the Reagan administration
to increase the security assistance to $900 million: $125 million in grant military assistance;
$300 million in foreign military sales credits; $475 million in economic assistance.' 55
Marcos recognized his need for American help, but he resisted the growing opposition in
the United States to his dictatorial methods and his violations of human rights.
The military assistance gave the AFP weapons to defend themselves and kill NPA, but
the economic assistance did not find its way to those people in the countryside or in the city
slums who desperately needed it. As a result, the reason for the people to participate in the
insurgency and harbor armed guerillas remained intact. The aid did nothing for U.S.
interests except more closely link American aid to Marcos and his elitist cronies. Marcos
would remain unsuccessful in his efforts to control the NPA unless he attacked the root
cause of the insurgency--poverty in the countryside and in the cities.
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F. BENIGNO AND CORY AQUINO
Filipinos became increasingly dissatisfied with Marcos and his repressive measures;
but the people were most dissatisfied with Marcos' inability to destroy the causes of the
social ills which he had advertised as being the reason for his desertion from democratic
practices in the first place. The Filipinos faced a Hobson's choice for government: either a
repressive dictatorship or a radical anti-government movement. However, when the failure
of state capitalism began to squeeze all but the very wealthy in the early 1980s, the
dissatisfaction of Marcos' domestic opponents increased and a moderate alternative
emerged. Marcos' most formidable opponent, Benigno Aquino, would be that alternative.
Aquino was was above all the symbol of the opposition to Marcos, and not by any means
the symbol of hope for the masses that his wife would become.
Benigno Aquino had been arrested in the 1972 crackdown and charged with
subversion, murder and illegal arms possession. He was convicted and sentenced to death,
but after widespread international protest, Benigno Aquino's sentence was commuted to
life in prison. In May 1980, following a lengthy stay in prison and numerous protests
from abroad, Marcos permitted Aquino to travel to the U.S. for medical treatment and
remain there in exile. 156
As early as August 1980, Aquino again began to challenge Marcos from exile. Over
the next three years Aquino called upon Marcos to curb repression, reverse state capitalism
and redistribute the nation's wealth. His message naturally appealed to those suffering
under Marcos. 157 However, to successfully oppose Marcos for the presidency, Aquino
knew he had to return to the Philippines. On 21 August 1983, immediately upon his return
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from the U.S., but while still in the custody of R.P. government troops who were
escorting him from the plane, Aquino was shot to death. 158 The assassination was never
directly linked to--but ultimate responsibility was attributed to, President Marcos.
After the assassination of Aquino, Marcos was able to ride out the protests, and for a
time reassert himself as the strongman ruler of the Philippines. However, Marcos was still
unable to divert international attention from the Benigno Aquino murder trial and the
possibility that witnesses may link him to the assassination. In December 1985, when
General Fabian C. Ver, a longtime Marcos crony, was acquitted along with others in the
assassination of Aquino, the immediate hope of linking Marcos to the murder was lost.
However, in the eyes of the world community, President Marcos was discredited and his
removal from office assured. 159
The Filipino people had been desperately searching for an alternative to Marcos and
they finally found one in December 1985 when Cory Aquino agreed to run for president.
Cory had qualifications which excited the Filipino public to adoration: she was the widow
of the martyr, Benigno Aquino; she was the antithesis of Ferdinand Marcos, the
quintessential Filipino politician; and something entirely new--hope for the masses. Cory
seemed to represent a better level of living for the poor, particularly if it could bring about
the elimination of the communist menace and the achievement of land reform.
The unrest following the unhappy verdict of the Aquino trial underscored the total
decay of Marcos' political and economic house of cards. By early 1986, capital flight was
spreading financial panic throughout the Philippines, and international banks began
158. Kamow, Image, p. 402-403.
159. Karnow, I , pp. 440-441.
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withholding credit and calling in mature loans. 160 It was common knowledge that by this
time, Marcos and his cronies managed to garner one-half of all public and private assets in
the Philippines and use them to amass their personal fortunes.16 1 In early 1986, the
corrupt Marcos dictatorship and his economy of "state capitalism" were on the brink of total
collapse.
Aquino won the snap election for a new president on 7 February 1986, but Marcos
refused to leave Malacanang. In a desperate effort to retain power, Marcos declared a state
of emergency on 24 February 1986, but his efforts were hopeless. 162 The very next day
the pressures at home and from abroad forced Marcos and his family to flee to Hawaii.
Cory Aquino moved into Malacanang and the Filipino people finally had a leader they
believed would carry out the promise of political and agrarian reform.
In his final years of rule, Marcos had become the personification of all the evils that he
campaigned against in his first presidential election. What was his legacy? In twenty years
Marcos managed to abandon democracy in favor of political dictatorship; turn a free market
economy into one controlled by the state; create an environment ripe for a communist
movement, complete with guerilla army, to flourish; participate in a level of corruption
which would drive the average Filipino into abject poverty and the nation into bankruptcy.
The political and economic devastation which Marcos left in his wake would be a daunting
challenge for any successor, even for one who entered office with all the glamor and
accolades accorded to Cory Aquino.
160. The World Bank, Philippines: A Framework For Economic Recovery
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VII. CURRENT POLITICS
Although President Aquino inherited the economic and political nightmare left behind
by Ferdinand Marcos, her messianic-like rise to the presidency made even the most hopeful
dreams of the Filipino people seem possible. Cory Aquino had humbly described herself
before the election as a "simple housewife," yet she managed to unite her people as never
before and bring down the most selfish dictator the nation had ever known.
Her singular accomplishments won immeasurable support from those who wanted no
more of Marcos. She would be faced with the challenge not only of restoring democratic
methods but of achieving a level of living for all Filipinos that would relieve the country of
the threat of insurgency and the heaviest burdens of poverty.
Would Cory Aquino be able to restore confidence in the Philippine government? In
fulfilling the dreams of the masses would she be the first leader to achieve land reform?
How would she deal with the NPA? Could she transform the armed forces of the
Philippines into a disciplined fighting force? Would the military and economic aid policies
of the U.S. adequately support her program of national development? In sum, how would
President Aquino deal with the social and economic ills which led to insurgency in the first
place?
A. GOVERNMENT REFORM
Cory Aquino's most important task after assuming office was to attack the roots of
insurgency which threatened the fundamental stabilit) of her nation. But before she could
do that, she would have to reestablish the democratic principles and procedures which had
been traditional in the Philippines before the advent of Marcos' martial law. The Filipinos
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would have to regain their faith in government for the Philippines to become a thriving
nation.
President Aquino took firm control of the government when she moved into
Malacanang. She knew that dismantling the remnants of the Marcos regime and
reconstructing the government were the nation's most urgent challenges, but the people
were the focus of her first official act.' 63 On 3 March 1986, President Aquino issued a
proclamation which restored the full protection for individuals against arrest without
charges. 164 With this gesture she immediately let the Filipino people know that they were
her first priority and that there would be a clear distinction between her administration and
the Marcos administration. However, the President was not afraid to ask the people for
something in return.
President Aquino believed she would need a "Freedom Constitution" for
approximately six months to givc her absolute authority to administer the government and
make the changes she saw as necessary.1 65 To take this radical step she would ask for
support from the people, and she would get it. 166 On 25 March 1990, President Aquino
revoked the 1973 Marcos' Constitution, abolished the national assembly and reserved all
legislative powers for herself.1 67 The Filipinos expressed a near reverence for their
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president and for a time were willing to permit Cory Aquino and the Philippine government
to be one and the same.
The speedy composition of a constitution was central to President Aquino's plan for
government. She selected fifty distinguished citizens to serve on a Constitutional
Commission (Concom) and author a new constitution. Concom's work drew heavily upon
the Commonwealth Constitution of 1935, but some provisions were tailored to the
especially difficult problems faced by Filipinos during the Marcos years: the powers of the
military and police were narrowly defined, the presidency was limited to one six year term,
armed groups without duly constituted authority were outlawed, and the legislature was
given a voice in the fate of the U.S. bases. 168
To ensure the integrity of the judiciary was included in her plans for a fresh start,
President Aquino called for the resignation of all Marcos appointees on the Supreme Court,
the intermediate Appellate Courts and the local Courts of First Instance. She appointed
former Justice Claudio Teehankee to the seat of Chief Justice and depended upon him to
recast the judiciary. 169 Her detractors, searching for anything to criticize, would call this
the "massacre of the judiciary."
The Philippine public sensed Cory Aquino had their interests at heart and they freely
gave her their unqualified support. However, this support was countered by the less than
loyal stance of many of those in her administration. In particular her Defense Minister,
Juan Ponce Enrile, and her Vice-President, Salvador Laurel, were vocal in their opposition.
Enrile fancied himself to be better presidential material than Aquino. He even called
the president a "little dictator" in a bitter criticism of the way she exercised emergency
168. Buss, Aquino, p. 78.
169. Buss, Aquino, p. 65.
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powers. Enrile made humiliating public demands of his President, insisting she reinstate
the 1973 Constitution, remove cabinet officers who opposed him, call an early presidential
election, permit the military to take part in negotiations with the NPA and return Marcos
loyalists to their former government jobs. 170 Even in her humiliation, President Aquino
remained tolerant and asked Enrile for his support. His answer was to take a hard-line
position against the NPA and oppose President Aquino's attempts to negotiate a cease-fire
agreement.
Enrile continued to test Aquino's patience. He sought support from Marcos loyalists
in what seemed to be a personal bid for power, 17 1 but he committed his ultimate act of
disloyalty as a cabinet member by participating in the failed coup of November 1986.172
Weary of Enrile's provocations, President Aquino finally fired him.1 73 Had the President
shown weakness by simply firing Enrile? Was his ouster an appropriate punishment for
one perpetrating an act viewed in most other countries as treason--a capital offense?
President Aquino's problem with disloyal subordinates did not stop with Enrile.
There had also been a growing rift between President Aquino and her own Vice-President,
Salvador H. Laurel. Similar to Enrile, Laurel publicly criticized President Aquino for her
"Freedom Constitution," indecisive handling of the NPA, and insistence on retaining
certain cabinet members. 174 Laurel quit his post as Foreign Secretary in September 1987
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and claimed that he had been kept in the dark and never allowed to participate in the Aquino
inner circle.1 75 Laurel remained in his elected position as Vice-President, but he would
continue to be a belligerent opponent to the efforts of President Aquino.
Th. draft constitution was approved by the Philippine Congress on 12 October 1986,
thereby preparing the way for a national referendum on the issue. When the people were
presented with the plebiscite on 2 February 1987, 85% of the eligible voters turned out to
vote 176 and 80% of the voters approved the proposed constitution. 7 7 Overwhelming
success in the referendum repudiated the argument that Cory Aquino was a "little dictator."
It seemed that President Aquino was indeed leading her nation out from under the dark
shadow of Marcos. It is unfortunate that this referendum may have been the high point in
Cory Aquino's presidency.
In tribute to President Aquino, she had set the mechanics of government back into
good working order by mid-1987. However, her success in restoring the government did
not mean that she had instilled confidence in the people for their government. To do this,
President Aquino would have to lead an effective attack on the social and economic roots of
insurgency. In particular, she needed an agrarian reform program that worked, and a
method for effectively dealing with the armed insurgents. In her campaign against
Marcos, Cory Aquino made it clear that she had a mission--to right many of the wrongs in
Philippine society. Now that the Philippines had the workings of a democratic
175. Seth Mydans, "No. 2 In Philippines Quits Cabinet Post In Rift With Aquino,"
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government, how well would President Aquino attack the chasm between the elite and the
common people?
B. LAND REFORM
Within a year of taking office President Aquino had reconstituted the R.P. government
and reestablished the 9re-martial law Philippine tradition of democratic rule. President
Aquino realized that she would have to attack the social and economic roots of misery
because they threatened to reverse her government initiatives, fuel the insurgency, and
perpetuate the suffering of the people. As has been seen, the unjust distribution of land in
Philippine agrarian society had been a root cause for protest in the Philippines since the
Spanish Colonial Era, and it was no different under the Aquino administration.
Cory Aquino knew this, and it was her campaign promise to implement land reform
which became the cornerstone of peasant support for her presidepcy. The ordinary people
of the Philippines gave the President their unqualified support for over one year, but in
mid-1987 they began to question her sincerity concerning land reform. Could President
Aquino make good on the campaign promises which Presidents Macapagal, Magsaysay,
and Marcos also made, but failed to keep?
In July 1987, President Aquino issued a non-binding land reform proposal, the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). 178 The proposal had non-specific,
broad guidelines which distributed some land to the peasants, made tenancy on government
property easier, and improved agricultural extension. 179 The proposal was a clear
178. Armando B. Heredia, "The Philippines Insurgency," in Military Basing and the
US/Soviet Military Balance in Southeast Asia, ed. George K. Tanham and Alvin H.
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compromise measure and disappointed Aquino's supporters at home and abroad who
believed agrarian reform was finally at hand.' 80 Her program was Marcos' reform plan
warmed over; a program in which the real decision-making responsibility remained in the
hands of a Congress dominated by landowners. 181
President Aquino's plan clearly favored the large landowners and not the peasants and
she would soon disiance herself from the land reform issue.182 President Aquino
delegated those responsibilities to her Agrarian Reform Minister, Heherson Alvarez and
told him, "Do what you think is good and let's carry it out."1 83 He resurrected the Marcos
reform program which in 16 years had redistributed only one-fifth of the land identified for
reform.1 84 To make matters worse President Aquino did not restrain a swarm of central
government officials who were needling local politicians to protect the lands of their
constituents from the government program. 185 Simply, President Aquino was knuckling
under to political pressure and some of the pressure was coming from her family members.
As a presidential candidate, Cory Aquino promised to make her family's 15,000 acre
sugar plantation, Hacienda Luisita, an agrarian reform "model" for the nation's landowners
180. Anthony Dyson, "Asia Yearbook 1989," Far Eastern Economic Review, Jan
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to follow. 186 But when Alvarez was questioned on the President's failure to implement the
program on her family's property he stated,
"This is a very democratic president. She will have to talk to her brothers and
sisters. There is a ticklish problem of family and interpersonal relationships
there." 187
The fact was the President had the opportunity to unilaterally implement reform under the
"Freedom Constitution." What she did was to convert her hacienda into a joint stock
company, allegedly assigning some equity to each of her workers. In effect, she took her
own property out from under the general provisions of the land reform law. Was it, as she
said, that she did not want to abuse her authority by circumventing the democratic system,
or was she having second thoughts about directly attacking the fabulous wealth of those
within her own family and social class?
The land reform bill, which was finally approved by Congress and signed by
President Aquino in 1988, disappointed even the least demanding farmer organizations.
Nevertheless, the new Comprehensive Land Reform Law (CARL) was an improvement
over previous reform attempts. Sugar and coconut plantations- -areas never before
considered for redistribution, were now targeted. Further, the plan called for peasants to
receive either land for tilling or profit sharing on their haciendas. However, the program
still excluded one-fourth of the intended beneficiaries. 188
By 1989, the landowners had labelled the effort as communistic and managed to find
legal loopholes in the program to circumvent the law. Only 37% percent of the landowners
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targeted by the program complied with the requirement to register their property. 189
Landowners even threatened to rise up in arms 190 and take steps toward independence for
islands like Negros. 19 1 The landowners had strong support from their peers in
government. On two occasions when President Aquino attempted to appoint a new
Agrarian Reform Minister, she was refused by the Commission on Appointments.1 92 Her
appointees were rejected because they were considered too strict and too conscientious.
The political strength of the landed elite had solidified such that redistribution of land
became impossible.
President Aquino failed to live up to her campaign promises for land reform. The
reaction of the people to Aquino's agrarian reform efforts was similar to the reaction to
Macapagal's program--the landed elite were enraged and the peasants felt betrayed. The
divisions between the elite and masses were being reinforced. Something had happened
because the fervor with which President Aquino attacked the problems of government
reform had faded. Aquino would join Magsaysay, Macapagal, and Marcos as a failure in
her efforts to implement effective agrarian reform, and the masses would have nowhere to
turn except to the communist leaders of insurgency.
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C. STATUS OF THE CPP/NPA
While President Aquino was restructuring the Philippine government and struggling
with agrarian reform, she was also working toward a dialogue with the the NPA--the
amed branch of the CPP. Marcos had begun the struggle against the NPA and he enjoyed
varying degrees of military success, but the insurgency always managed to survive.
President Aquino would take a different approach and attempt to reason with the rebels.
She believed the twenty year-old insurgency would end if she successfully implemented
agrarian reform and permitted repentant rebels to participate in her government. She
lumped together the CPP, the NPA, the National Democratic Front (NDF) and all other
opposition elements as communist rebels.
When President Aquino took office in 1986, it was her hope that all Filipinos would
take part in rebuilding their nation, including the rebels. Even before becoming president,
she had let it be known that she would be willing to permit those Communists w)>'
renounced violence to enter her government. 193 After becoming president, she began to
make good on her promise and extended an olive branch to those in the communist
movement. In the first week of March 1986, !7kesident Aquino released from prison Jose
Maria Sison--the CPP's intellectual founder, and Commander Dante--the NPA's
commander.1 94 The two rebel leaders were divided in their reaction to her gesture. Sison
neither publicly nor privately supported the President, but Dante declared support for
193. "Aquino Says She Will Fight Violent Communists," The New York Times, 10
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Aquino and even wore a yellow shirt, Aquino's campaign colors, to their meeting at
Malacanang. 195
For a time, the president and her communist opponents continued to show flexibility in
their delicate relationship. Presider t Aquino offered the communist insurgents a generous
amnesty plan which would give them job training and provide a safe haven for the rebels
and their families. 196 In the other camp the communists softened their rhetoric. Saturnino
Ocampo, a high-ranking CPP official ostensibly responsible for the NDF, even proposed
flexibility in the once hard-line economic and political policies of the CPP. 197 It was clear,
some members on both sides were willing to discuss the prospects for an agreement.
The government and NPA entered into negotiations on 20 June 1986 and on 27
November signed a cease-fire agreement. 198 Approximately 900 people had died in the
insurgency since Aquino's election. 199 For its duration, the cease-fire would save lives,
but skeptics saw the agreement as an opportunity for military forces on both sides to rest
and reformulate strategy.20 0 In the end, the government and the communists could not
come to any long-term agreement and when the 60-day cease-fire ended, the two sides left
the talks to redouble their efforts in the armed conflict.20 1
195. Jones, Red Revolution, p. 253.
196. Francis X. Clines, "Aquino Plans A Pilot Program For Rebel Amnesty," The
New York Times, 19 March 1986, p. 10.
197. Jones, Red Revolution, p. 279.
198. "This Week: Philippines," Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 July 1986, p. 11.
199. "Talking At Last," Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 May 1986, p. 11.
200. James Clad, "Please Hold Your Fire," Far Eastern Economic Review, 11
December 1986, pp. 48-49.
201. James Clad, "No War, No Peace," Far Eastern Economic Review, 19 February
1987, pp. 14-15.
67
President Aquino tried to reason with the rebels and for a time dealt with the
communist representatives in an atmosphere of optimism. But as she settled into the
second year of her presidency, rebels and government forces were again locked in a
stalemate just as they had been during the Marcos regime. President Aquino recognized
that she had to deal with the communist threat, but she also recognized that many of the
disaffected supported the CPP, NDF, and NPA because they lacked hope.
Having endured harsh criticism in the past for being soft on the communists, President
Aquino assumed a tough stance and vowed in a speech to Philippine Military Academy
cadets that victory and not compromise would end the rebellion. 20 2 However, the hot
tempo of the conflict existing before the cease-fire did not immediately resurface. In fact,
some communists even participated in the May 1987 congressional elections. 203 It was a
surprising move because with their participation in the elections the communists legitimized
the Aquino government.
In spite of the participation of some communists in the election, the conflict between
the government and communists quickly approached its former intensity and returned to
what the CPP defined as "strategic stalemate." By 1990, the NPA, the CPP's armed
branch, would be operating on each of the eleven major islands and in 60 of the 73
provinces; 204 however, the degree of control exercised by these rebels would remain
uncertain. As will be seen below, the NPA would soon compete with coup plotters to be
the major source of opposition to the Aquino government and its own armed forces.
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To break free from the stalemate, the CPP modified NPA strategy and took the war to
metropolitan Manila.20 5 To advance its political agenda, make headlines and embarrass the
government, the leadership began targeting Americans and Filipinos for assassination. In
1987 alone, 100 Filipino soldiers, policemen and civilians were assassinated in
metropolitan Manila. 2° 6 Between 1986 and 1990, ten U.S. servicemen were shot to death
including three killed outside Clark Air Base on 28 October 1987.207 In August 1990,
NPA Chief Romulo Kintanar (who succeeded Dante) warned that the R.P. government
could "expect an escalated and more vigorous people's movement and urban partisan
operations in these (urban) areas."' 20 8 These deaths and the Aquino administration's
inability to bring the assassins to justice would underscore the R.P. government's
weakness and the NPA's strength.
The CPP is entering its third decade of anti-government activity and boasts 20,000209
armed guerillas (the NPA) and 500,000 sympathizers. 210 These sympathizers were a small
part of the "masses" whom the Communist claimed to represent. In Maoist terminology
they were the sea in which the fish (the armed guerillas) must swim. However, the CPP
leadership, traditionally manned by university educated cadres, is being replaced by
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peasants at every level in the hierarchy. Current leaders still have links with the middle and
upper class in the Philippines, but the participation of peasants, labor, students, parish
priests and others of the under-privileged in the leadership--formerly the CPP's ideological
objective--is now the cause of some consternation. The current elite leadership in the CPP
condescendingly claims that a less educated, peasant-led CPP would lose its motivation and
f,Cus.211 Are those in the CPP leadership dedicated ideologues or could it be that they
have become comfortable in their leadership role and are just another elite interest group
jealously guarding their power?
Aquino failed to achieve lasting peace as she failed to bring land reform and it became
increasingly apparent that she would be unable to bring about the prosperity she had
promised to the people. President Aquino weathered these difficulties, but as her failures
mounted she became increasingly vulnerable to a grab for power and military men disloyal
to their president would take advantage of this opportunity.
D. THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
President Aquino faced difficult times in restructuring the government, implementing
land reform and opposing the rebels, but it was the disloyalty of her own military which
became the greatest threat to her administration. The military had been the bedrock of
President Marcos' strength, however President Aquino's inability to handle the nation's
problems and her less than aggressive leadership style alienated many military officers. As
a result, President Aquino would face a string of coup attempts.
211. Jones, Red Revolution, p. 308-309.
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The Filipino people had bestowed "hero" status upon members of the AFP for their
efforts in ousting Marcos, 212 but a military coup attempt in the summer of 1986 began to
denigrate that fledgling reputation. On 6 July three hundred and fifty rebel soldiers led by
Marcos' former running mate, Arturo Tolentino, took over the Manila Hotel. Tolentino
declared himself President and held out for two days before it became apparent that his
support was limited only to the rebel soldiers within the hotel. Tolentino and his men
surrendered to an Aquino representative without a fight.2 13
Tolentino's coup attempt never posed a serious threat to the government, but a
dangerous precedent was set when General Fidel Ramos unconditionally welcomed the
rebel soldiers back into the AFP and Defense Miniser Juan Ponce Enrile declared that all
military men involved in the coup attempt would be absolved of their crime. 214 In what
became a mockery of the "Manila Hotel Incident," the men were required to do push-ups.
Aquino may not have been intimidated by the coup attempt, but her administration
displayed questionable judgement when the charges against Tolentino were dropped in
exchange for his pledge of allegiance to the existence of the Aquino government. The coup
attempt did not seem to affect Aquino's popularity, but her timid handling of the
perpetrators set the stage for further trouble.
Her performance in the "Manila Hotel Incident" and the persistent coup rumors
attempts led many to question the president's ability to lead. On 23 November 1986,
General Fidel Ramos detected another plot against Aquino and confronted its chief
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perpetrator, Defense Minister Enrile. The plot was stopped before it had really begun. The
fact that a government minister and a professional organization of dedicated young officers,
the Reform the AFP Movement (RAM), were involved made this attempt particularly
threatening. 215 With this revelation, Aquino had to fire her entire cabinet to preserve her
diminishing credibility.
On 27 January 1987, there was another coup attempt against Aquino. This time 500
rebel soldiers loyal to Marcos were the perpetrators and they took control of key military
installations, broadcast stations and public utilities. 2 16 The rebels claimed to be saving the
Philippines from its drift toward communism and chanted "Marcos forever." When
President Aquino learned of the attempt, she went on television and stated,
"Let me be perfectly clear: we will not treat this like the Manila Hotel incident.
There is a time for reconciliation and a time for justice and retribution." 217
Her threats seemed to make little difference to the rebels.
A charismatic RAM leader, Lieutenant Colonel Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan, and one
hundred of his supporters approached General Ramos and threatened to join the rebellion if
soldiers supporting Marcos were killed in a government attack. The rebel soldiers were
never attacked, but left their positions on 29 January without a fight. The rebels were
neither arrested nor punished. Aquino was once again successful in resisting a coup
attempt, but it was a hollow victory because she appeared increasingly out of control. 218
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On 28 August 1987, "Gringo" Honasan led 800 of his own supporters, the "RAM
boys," in yet another coup attempt against the Aquino government.2 19 Honasan and his
men attacked two military bases, four of the five television stations and President Aquino's
residence at Malacanang. Sixty people were killed before forces loyal to Aquino crushed
the two-day rebellion. 220 Honasan temporarily escaped arrest, but was eventually captured
in Manila and jailed on 9 December 1987.221 In early April 1988, Honasan escaped from
his prison boat and the 13 men assigned to be his guards joined him.
On 1 December 1989, in the fifth major coup attempt (as of Jan. 1991, there had been
eight coup attempts of differing degrees) against Aquino, rebel soldiers attacked
government installations and strategic facilities in Manila. "Gringo" Honasan was at the
center of this most extensive and serious attempt against Aquino. 222 However, there was a
new dynamic in this coup attempt. President George W. Bush authorized U.S. fighter
planes to overfly Manila in a show of American support for President Aquino. 223
The psychological effect of the American involvement was devastating to the rebels
and a pro-Aquino resolution to the rebellion became apparent at that point.2 24
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Approximately 80 people had been killed, but once again the rebel soldiers were permitted
to return to the ranks of the AFP--this time singing. Juan Ponce Enrile even stated, the
rebels "never even entertained the thought that they lost."225 A result of American military
support for Aquino would strain the relationship between U.S. military officers and many
R.P. officers who had been sympathetic to the rebellion. For the first time the Americans
had actively taken one side against the other.
President Aquino set up the Davide Commission, named after the chairman, to
investigate the December 1989 coup attempt. The chief suspects in the rebellion were Vice-
President Salvador Laurel, former Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, and President
Aquino's cousin, Eduardo Cojuangco.226 The commission's report indicated that there
had been a collaboration between troops loyal to Marcos and troops loyal to Honasan. The
report further stated the coup attempt would have continued and maybe succeeded had
General Ramos not agreed to some rebel demands.227
By the fall of 1990, President Aquino had survived the five major coup attempts which
had been staged by one of two cliques within her own military. It was abundantly clear
that President Aquino had failed to instill discipline in the AFP and as a result did not have
a military which was loyal to the constitution which she had worked so hard to attain. The
AFP had become more interested in the assumptions of power than in the elimination of the
insurgency. This caused the Americans to make an "ongoing reappraisal" of their own
position in the Philippines. Heretofore, it had been assumed that the common concern of
225. David E. Sanger, "Officials In Philippines Tell How Leaders Almost Lost," The
New York Times, 8 December 1989, p.
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the government of the United States and the government of the Philippines had been to
bring the Philippines insurgency to an end and that the chief instrumentality for that
purpose had been the AFP. With the attempted coups this assumption was no longer valid.
All this had its immediate effects on the U.S. gox ernment policy of unequivocal and
enthusiastic support for the Aquino administration. The time had come, particularly when
considering the global collapse of Soviet power and communist ideology, to reexamine the
continuing U.S. policy of military and economic support for its democratic ally, the
Philippines.
E. U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID
For President Aquino, accepting financial assistance from the United States was at the
same time a necessity and a burden. Through the experience of her husband and herself
during the Magsaysay years, she was thoroughly aware of the value of American support
to the Philippines in its struggle a .ainst insurgency. The President still desperately needed
American assistance for the Philippines to recover from the devastation of the Marcos years
in spite of the necessity to project herself as an independent thinker free of American
control. The Americans would continue a policy of support for Aquino, and economic and
military assistance would be a key instrument for implementing that policy. But what
would President Aquino really accomplish even with American assistance for either the
R.P. or U.S.? Would the combined efforts of Americans and Filipinos stop the communist
rebels, promote the welfare of Filipinos, or end the coup attempts?
The Philippines needed assistance badly. The World Bank completed a study in 1988
which observed that more than half of the fifty-six million Filipinos had been unable for
years to even satisfy their basic needs. Further, there were more poor people in the
Philippines than at any time in history. The study faulted the government's neglect of rural
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areas, the tax evasion of the wealthy and the inequitable distribution of land. 228 Beyond
worsening living conditions, the nation was burdened with a foreign debt of $28 billion229
and a population growth Tate of 2.8%. This meant an annual debt service of $2 billion and
a population increase to 85 million by the year 2000.230
U.S. government officials realized the Philippines was facing a grim future and
desperately needed American assistance. On 16 May 1986, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State John Monjo articulated American foreign policy goals for a post-Marcos Philippines.
The goals were to forge strong ties with the new Philippine leadership, help restore
economic prosperity, enhance the effectiveness and professionalism of the AFP and
maintain a close defense relationship with the R.P..2 31 Presumably, the American aid
program was designed to assist in achieving these goals. It was not clear to what extent
"defense relationship" meant defense against external aggressors or internal insurgents.
The promotion of democracy in the Philippines was apparently taken for granted.
American aid to the Philippines was already $400 million annually,232 but after
Aquino's victory over Marcos President Ronald Reagan increased the contribution by $150
million. 233 The larger portion of the $550 million was in the form of military and
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232. Nayan Chanda, "Reagan Pays Up," Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 May
1986, pp. 12-13.
233. Bernard Weinraub, "Reagan Has Talks On Tokyo Siimmit and Calls Aquino,"
The New York Times, 25 April 1986, p. 1.
76
economic support aid. The Reagan administration's rationale was that well-armed
communist guerillas were the greatest threat to democracy in the Philippines and Aquino
needed more arms to continue the fight where Marcos had left off.234
However, American expenditures were not limited to the $550 million. Each year the
U.S. government also spent a total of $357 million on Filipino worker salaries, local
purchases by U.S. personnel, military construction, local U.S. government procurement
and checks to retired service personnel. 235 The total annual economic impact of the U.S.
government on the Philippines between 1984 and 1989 would be approximately $900
million. 236
Hoping for more, President Aquino told Secretary of State George P. Schultz that the
U.S. aid package fell far short of what was needed, but she was reconciled to not getting
any more at the time. 237 In her 18 September 1986 speech before the U.S. Congress,
President Aquino stated that Marcos "set aside democracy to save it from a communist
insurgency that numbered less than 500.. .By the time he fled, that insurgency had grown
to 16,000."238 The only Communist she counted were the NPA. Implied in her speech
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was the fact that the Americans had provided an abundant stockpile of weapons to Marcos
in his twenty year fight against the NPA, but the NPA still managed to thrive.
President Aquino was right. The AFP had been provided all the weapons it needed to
fight the NPA. If those other than the Philippine elite were to prosper, only economic
assistance provided to the needy people would really benefit the R.P. in its recovery from
the Marcos fiasco. Unfortunately, military hardware was readily available in the U.S. and
dollars for tangible and direct assistance for the masses were not. The U.S. Congress was
wrestling with its own federal budget crisis and faced fiscal cuts mandated in the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings bill.239
Because of the desperate need for further aid on the part of the Philippines, and in spite
of the budgetary difficulties in the United States, the two nations agreed to review the MBA
in October 1988. The Filipinos did not agree, but the Americans believed the promises
they made during the MBA review were fair. There were five significant provisions: the
reaffirmation of a mutual security relationship; the promise by the U.S. to make its best
effort to provide financial assistance to strengthen R.P. security and support economic and
social development; the promise by the U.S. to purchase more Philippine products; the
agreement on improving security of the bases; the promise by the U.S. to develop a
program of budget support for the R.P. government. 240
The Americans had no more resources to provide beyond the military agreements so
they spearheaded an international effort to get more assistance for Aquino. They crcated a
Multi-lateral Assistance Initiative (MAI) which was to raise $2 billion annually from the
international community. The Americans were to contribute $200 million each year in
239. Buss, Aquino, p. 176.
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March 1989, Vol no. 121. (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1989) pp. 23-24.
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addition to the aid package related to the bases. 241 By the fall of 1990 the program was
just getting under way.
The U.S. could not possibly provide enough assistance to the Philippines to solve the
economic problems of President Aquino. But, would any amount have been enough?--
there were as many NPA guerillas and sympathizers as there had ever been; the Filipino
people were as poor as they had ever been; the landed elite were defying the new land
reform law; and the military had proven its disloyalty in five major coup attempts.
Some disturbing realities plagued both Americans and Filipinos who were seeking a
new and improved program for U.S.-R.P. relations. U.S. foreign policy objectives had
not been reached: ties between the U.S. and Philippine leadership were only slightly better
than under Marcos; the stability of the Philippine economy was not restored; and the
Philippine military could not defend its President or its constitution. Further, the Philippine
military could neither defeat the insurgents nor protect the Philippines from a reasonable
external threat. Finally, the relationship between the U.S. and R.P. military was
additionally strained when it became abundantly clear in the December 1989 coup that it
was only the appearance of the American jets that saved President Aquino's position.
Unfortunately, charisma alone could not solve the national problems facing the R.P.
and in time it became apparent that Cory Aquino had the moral strength, but maybe not the
political skill to effect the necessary changes her nation so desperately needed. She was
able to reconstruct the government, but the hopes she held for reconciliation with the
communists, land reform and a disciplined armed forces were never realized.
241. U. S. Congress. House of Representatives. Foreign Assistance Legislation For
FY 1990-1991. 101st Congress, 1st session, 1989, p. 569.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The roots of the current insurgency in the Philippines reach deep into the history of the
Filipino people and arise from the inequitable relationship between the landed elite and the
masses. For nearly 100 years the U.S. has exercised varying degrees of control over the
Philippines and executed a wide range of policies, but none of these efforts have been
directed at the root causes of insurgency. While U.S. policies have advanced U.S. national
interests, within the Philippines they have often worked for the benefit of the elite and to
the detriment of the common people. Today, the centuries-old division of the classes is
perpetuated by those who benefit most from the division--the Philippine elite.
Unfortunately, current U.S. policy tends to aggravate this situation. The time has come to
reassess the interests of the U.S. in the R.P.--to reappraise our policies--giving full
consideration to the effects that our judgement will have on the future of democracy in the
Philippines, and the ability of the Philippine government to solve its social and economic
problems.
Traditional U.S. policy has worked to advance the interest of the Philippine elite--
whether deliberately or inadvertently. It has been dedicated first to U.S. national interests,
but second to the interests of the Philippine government. During the American colonial
administration, the elite were able to use the new land ownership laws and business
methods to consolidate their power and suppress the desires of the common people. When
the Philippines regained independence, the elite would be the ones to take charge of their
nation's destiny. By controlling the seat of government and also enjoying the leverage
associated with American economic, military and political support, the Philippine elite were
able to consolidate their power as never before.
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What does a review of the Philippine elite's leadership record indicate? The elite have
shown in each era of Philippine history that their allegiance is not primarily to their nation,
but first and foremost to perpetuating themselves and their class in power. From one era to
the next, the elites have had more in common with the Spanish and Americans who
presided over them than they did with the Filipinos whom they ruled. When independence
was regained, the Filipino elite did not forge stronger bonds between themselves and the
underprivileged; instead, they continued many of the practices they learned while managing
other Filipinos for their colonial patrons. This track record indicates that the Philippine elite
may not be particularly suited to lead a government for all the people.
The Philippine elite have poor political leadership credentials, but they also
demonstrate an inability to resolve their own disagreements. Opportunistic elite ,ements
and not the insurgents represent the greater threat to government in the Philippines today.
The five major coup attempts against the current government illustrate this point. Sadly, it
appears the essence of elite in-fighting in the Philippines is motivated by the simple desire
by those out of power to be in power. However, in the midst of inter-class conflict, the
loyalty among the elite to one another remains steadfast. Elite loyalty is clearly
demonstrated by their shocking inability to jail one of their own--even for treason. This is
a concrete example of how membership in the ruling class of the Philippines takes priority
over national interests.
The AFP plays a role in inter-elite conflict, but it still manages to ensure the elite are in
political, military, and economic control of the nation. The AFP was developed during the
American colonial administration and became an effective anti-guerrilla force under
Magsaysay. However, it subsequently evolved into a guardian of the elite. The AFP
became a tool which elites in government would wield first against opposing elite cliques
and second against the insurgents. When factions within the AFP took sides in elite
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attempts to illegally overthrow the R.P. , rnment, the AFP clearly demonstrated that it
could neither satisfactorily defend the constitution nor the institution of the presidency. By
their actions, the AFP has confirmed that class interests are their first priority and national
interest only a secondary consideration.
While the Philippine elite were enjoying the new-found prosperity of the American
colonial period, some did so at the expense of the non-elites. When the elite took
advantage of the land ownership laws and business methods implemented by the
Americans, the profits were enhanced by the toil of the peasants. When the colonial
administration considered implementing land reform to calm agrarian unrest during the
Sakdal movement in the 1930s, the elite closed ranks to prevent the reforms. When the
elite took control of the government after independence, they jealously guarded their power
and denied to the peasants both land reform and the opportunity to share power. In the
years after independence, those who benefitted most from continued American support to
the Philippines--the elite in government--would renege on their promises to implement land
reform. The common people continued to be subjugated for th benefit of the Philippine
elite.
Individual Filipino leaders have intermittently introduced initiatives designed to
alleviate the suffering of the common people, but generally they governed their nation with
little consideration for the masses. Cory Aquino was the one leader who peasants believed
represented their hopes for socioeconomic reform. However, even she would disappoint
them. Her half-hearted attempt at land reform would be only one of her many failures.
Unfortunately, even though her efforts in favor of peasant demands wA'ere weak, they were
enough to infuriate her fellow landed elites and cause them to close ranks and resist the
reforms just as they had during the Sakdal Uprising. In the end, the Aquino administration
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was no more effective in improving the life of the peasants than was the larcenous
administration of Ferdinand Marcos.
Today, the traditional relationship between the elite, the masses and the Americans can
easily be seen: power and national wealth are as concentrated among the Philippine elite as
they have ever been; the Filipino masses are as poor as they have ever been; and the
Americans provide as much assistance is they ever have. Unfortunately, since 1899,
traditional U.S. policy in the Philippines has supported an elite leadership which has failed
the Filipino people miserably. But, could the U.S. have worked through the opposition
instead of the elite?
The time has come to seek a new way to provide assistance that will overcome the
failures of the past. This new way is not io extend help to the CPP and the NPA which are
avowed enemies of constitutional government. The CPP and NPA spearhead the current
insurgency but their organization is as fractured as that of the elites. The two groups are
aligned against the government, but the elites within the CPP seek power through political
change whereas poverty stricken masses supporting the conmunists traditionally seek relief
through agrarian reform.
It is important to recall that peasant grievances such as those voiced by the current
insurgency were addressed briefly by Magsaysay, Macapagal, Marcos and Aquino. In
each case the simple promise of land reform was enough to assuage peasant unrest.
Today, promises may no longer be enough, but some basic land reform is essential. A
successful attack on poverty would immediately rob the communists of their program and
deprive them of their reason for a separate guerilla army.
The same class conflict which characterizes Philippine society also exists in the
communist movement. T'e elites within the CPP resent the less educated NPA members
who are rising to take leadership positions within the CPP, even though participation by the
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peasants at every level of the organization was a principle objective of the movement's
founders. This fundamental change in attitude may stem from the CPP leadership's own
social roots which are found in the upper and middle classes of Philippine society. The
CPP leadership can be characterized as just another clique of elites who work to preserve
their own position.
The communists are not even secure in their own ideology. The intellectuals within
the CPP understand that in today's international environment they will find it impossible to
justify their movement in ideological terms. In the past, ideological platforms have been
little more than intellectual exercise or political plays. Since the events of Eastern Europe
and the U.S.S.R. in 1989 and 1990, it is impossible for any communist, even in the
Philippines, to claim that communist ideology is the way to socialist utopia. It is difficult to
interpret the CPP leadership's intentions in any other light than their fear of losing political
influence. After reviewing the communist record in the Philippines, there is no reason to
believe that the communist elite would have been better than any other elite in controlling
the Philippine government.
How do the Americans fit into this complicated equation? The Americans have been
both colonial master and wealthy patron to the Filipinos, but today they play a lesser role in
the affairs of the Philippines. The Americans cannot be viewetC as the catalyst for the class-
related problems which have plagued the Filipinos for over 400 years, but neither can they
be credited with solving the problems which they inherited. In any case, American
influence in the Philippines has now faded and the U.S. has less to do with the ultimate
success or failure of the current insurgency.
Every American administration since 1899 has determined that U.S. national interests
in the Philippines were best served by dealing exclusively with the elite. As a
consequence, the plight of the Philippine masses was not the major factor in determining
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U.S. policy. There are no apologies to be made by the Americans for implementing
policies adopted in the national interest; however, there was a price to be paid as those
policies became increasingly identified with the interests of the Philippine elite. Anti-
Americanism, nagging insurgencies, and the perpetual neglect of the common people by the
Philij; ,ne elite took their toll on the reputation of the U.S..
The U.S. is in position to reassess its policies in the Philippines and make them reflect
U.S. interests in the new world order. The containment of communism is no longer the
overarching strategy of the United States, and therefore the presence of U.S. forces on
Philippine bases is no longer as critical as it was. A military relationship which includes
access to Philippine bases need no longer be the major focus of U.S. interests in the
Philippines.
It is in the national interest of the U.S. of course to support the emergence of a truly
democratic Philippines which will provide all citizens the opportunity to participate in the
wealth and power of the nation. Since the American policy of helping the Philippines has
centered on its military component, it is appropriate to concentrate on changes in military
relations that will most advantageously contribute to the implementation of this fundamental
national interests. With this in mind, three alternative changes in direction of American
policies may be considered. Should the U.S. keep forces in the Philippines and persist
with current policy; should the U.S. keep forces in the Philippines and change current
policy; or should the U.S. withdraw forces from the Philippines and alter current policy?
If the U.S. keeps its military forces in the Philippines and persists with the traditional
policies which have benefitted the elites at the expense of the common people, the already
tenuous U.S.-R.P. bilateral relationship will continue to deteriorate. The Americans will
become even more closely identified with the Philippine elite and as a consequence,
Philippine nationalism and anti-American sentiment will thrive. Policy option one
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represents traditional U.S. policy and will allow the current insurgents to continue to use
their greatest propaganda weapon--the presence of "imperialist" U.S. forces and the affront
they pose to Philippine sovereignty.
By persisting with this policy, the chasm between the Philippine elite and the masses
will grow and cause the presence of U.S. forces to become even more necessary for the
perpetuation of the elite's position. However, the use of U.S. forces in domestic
Philippine political conflict would be senseless. If U.S. forces were to defend the elite-led
government as they did in the December 1989 coup attempt, the R.P. government's
inability to cope with very basic problems would be again uncovered and undoubtedly lead
to the government's overthrow. This policy will not nourish a more egalitarian society in
the Philippines, but instead it will denigrate the traditionally warm relationship between the
Philippine and American people. Since for 100 years traditional U.S. policies have not
brought a more egalitarian society in the Philippines, it can not be assumed that they would
achieve this objective today.
If the U.S. keeps its military forces in the Philippines, but establishes a new policy
which does not favor the elites, the U.S. will face opposition from the extremes in
Philippine society. When the elites in government detect the change in U.S. policy they
will likely threaten to remove U.S. forces from the Philippines to ameliorate their dilemma.
It is conceivable, albeit unlikely, that a "Guantanamo Bay" paradox may arise. In any
case, the elites would direct the wealth and political strength of the Philippines against U.S.
interests. When the Americans split with the elite, the insurgents will enjoy a propaganda
windfall. The insurgents will still be able to point to the continued presence of U.S. forces
as an affront to Philippine sovereignty, but they will be able to claim that their efforts drove
a wedge between the Americans and the elite "puppets."
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If the U.S. implements this second option and chooses not to support the elite, who
will receive U.S. backing--the present insurgents or some other possible moderate faction?
It is certain that the Americans will have no stomach to aid the current insurgents and, as
long as U.S. troops are present, any Filipino faction accepting American aid is likely to be
labelled as an American puppet and therefore doomed in Philippine politics. It seems
unlikely that option two will advance U.S. interests in the Philippines. In fact, the U.S.
will probably lose support from every sector of Philippine society and possibly face
decades of poor bilateral relations. This policy will be a mistake unless the U.S. faces an
unforeseen crisis which makes the presence of U.S. military forces in the Philippines seem
essential.
As for option three, if the U.S. withdraws its forces from the Philippines and changes
its traditional policies to reflect a neutral approach to internal politics in the Philippines, the
U.S. will be better able to advance its own interests. The current U.S.-U.S.S.R.
rapprochement makes withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Philippines practical.
"Containment" is no longer a relevant worldwide strategy for the Americans, and U.S.
forces which are stationed in the Philippines for this purpose are no longer a necessity.
Further, the bases have become a simple convenience because even without U.S. facilities
on Philippine bases there is not a nation which can successfully challenge the U.S.'s ability
to project naval and air power into Southeast Asia.
The present stature of U.S. forces in the Philippines makes them ineffectual beause
they cannot be sensibly committed to either fight the insurgency or defend the elite-led
government. U.S. forces have never been employed against the Philippine insurgency and
if they were to be, a political storm in the U.S. and Philippines would stop it. Further, as
explained earlier, U.S. forces also cannot be practically used to defend the elite-led
government in the Philippines. The use of American forces in either case would ultimately
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lead to the collapse of the R.P. government, and defeat the purpose of committing U.S.
forces in the first place.
The withdrawal of U.S. forces does not mean that the U.S. will abandon its interests
in the Philippines. It will likely deliver a psychological blow to the Philippine elite, but it
will also strip the insurgency of its greatest propaganda tool. The right-oriented leadership
in the government and the left-oriented leadership in the opposition will be forced to
compete for legitimacy, but be unable to use the Americans as either a crutch or an excuse.
The competition for leadership may lead to bloody conflict, but the division between the
elite and the masses is a problem only Filipinos can solve. When the Filipinos do solve




The international community is adjusting to the end of the "Cold War" and when the
adjustment is complete a new world order will be at hand. The national interests of all
nations are changing as former allies and enemies reformulate their policies to meet the
challenges of the emerging world order. In light of the new world order, the U.S. must
reformulate its policies in the Philippines. U.S. interests are no longer served by the
traditional U.S.-R.P. relationship. The presence of U.S. forces on Philippine bases is no
longer of critical interest to the U.S., but a truly democratic government which will provide
all citizens the opportunity to participate in the wealth and power of the nation is. To
pursue this latter objective the U.S. should withdraw its military forces from the
Philippines and find new methods to support democracy there.
Withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Philippines should begin as quickly as practical
and be completed before the century mark in U.S.-R.P. relations-- 1998. The withdrawal
should be conducted through bilateral agreement if possible, but through unilateral decision
if necessary. The U.S. must take care to meet the needs of former Philippine nati_,onl
employees through early retirement and severance pay.
To bolster democracy in the Philippines the U.S. should limit the conditions for
military assistance and make resources available for economic relief instead of economic
support for military assistance. This means rice and pan de sel instead of guns. To ensure
this the U.S. should not provide dollars to the R.P. government, but instead work directly
with those in need and provide them the appropriate assets and educational extension.
The U.S. withdrawal of its military forces from the Philippines and the provision of
economic assitance does not mean the abandonment of fundamental U.S. interests in peace,
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stability and progress for the Philippines or for the entire region of Southeast Asia. It only
means that with the end of the cold war, and the reappraisal of its global opportunities and
responsibilities, the U.S. is seeking the most effective way of sharing its leadership and
expertise with the Philippines as one of the more deserving of the third world countries.
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